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Expanding the Role of the Victim in a
Criminal Action: An Overview of
Issues and Problems
JOSEPHINE GI.FrLER*
There is a growing recognition that crime victims have identifiable inter-
ests of sufficient legitimacy and significance to justify expanding their role
in criminal proceedings beyond that as a mere non-party witness. This ar-
ticle traces the history of the victim in society and suggests reforms which
will help to place the crime victim back into a more meaningful position in
the American criminal justice system. Comparisons are made between dif-
fering state, national, and international victim programs and the author
provides some well-needed insight into the costs and benefits of implement-
ing new ideas which would assist in redefining the role of the victim in a
criminal action.
I. INTRODUCTION
The victims of crime are truly the forgotten people in the Amer-
ican criminal justice system and are all too often victimized
twice-first by the crime and then by the system.' In the last two
* B.A., Barnard College, Columbia University, 1965; J.D., Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law, 1968. Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. The President's Task Force on Victims of Crime concluded that "[tihe in-
nocent victims of crime have been overlooked, their pleas for justice have gone un-
heeded, and their wounds-personal, emotional and financial-have gone
unattended." PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 11
(Dec. 1982) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT]. For a concise
description of the negative impact of crime on its victims, and the inadequate re-
sponse of the criminal justice system and allied agencies to victims of crimes, see
id. at 2-13. See also Prologue: A Victim's View of Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM 13 (W. McDonald ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM]. See generally CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S Associ-
ATION, FORGOTTEN VICTIMS: AN ADVOCATE'S ANTHOLOGY (G. Nicholson, T. Condit &
S. Greenbaum eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FORGOTTEN VICTIMS]; F. CAR-
RINGTON, THE VICTIMS (1975); R. REIFF, THE INVISIBLE VICTIM (1979); Ash, On Wit-
nesses: A Radical Critique of Criminal Court Procedures, 48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 386
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Ash]; Knudten, Meade, Knudten & Doerner, The Vic-
tim in the Administration of Criminal Justice: Problems and Perceptions, in CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM, supra at 115 [hereinafter cited as Knudten, VICTIM
PROBLEMS AND PERCEPTIONS].
decades, however, the plight of crime victims increasingly has
been recognized by public policy-makers, official criminal justice
agencies, the legal community, and the general populace. 2 Public
consciousness regarding the problems faced by crime victims is
due largely to what is known as "the victim's rights movement,"
which encompasses a number of different organizations, groups,
and individuals with a common commitment to improving the
treatment and position of the victim, notwithstanding their varied
agendas.3
Much of the initial impetus for this movement stems from con-
cern about rape victims generated by feminists and women's or-
ganizations in the 1960's.4 The problems of other types of
victims-those plagued by family violence, 5 the elderly victim,6
2. Some indication of the heightened awareness of the problems and needs
of crime victims is demonstrated by the fact that President Ronald Reagan desig-
nated the week of April 19, 1982 as Crime Victim's Week and established a Task
Force on Victims of Crime. See Proclamation No. 4929, 47 Fed. Reg. 16,313 (1982);
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1.
3. For example, the National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA)
serves as a focus for advocacy on behalf of victims of crime. The American Bar
Association--Criminal Justice Section's Committee on Victims has developed
model legislation and recommendations for public policymakers, aimed at protect-
ing the victim-witness from intimidation and promoting fair treatment of victims.
The Victim's Assistance Legal Organization (VALOR) serves as a national
clearinghouse of information on victim's rights litigation and as a source of assist-
ance for litigation in this area. On the state and local level there are a number of
organized victim advocacy efforts; for a partial listing of organizations, see NA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, Program Directory (1983).
4. In the 1970's, rape and other types of sexual assault became the subject of
a number of books and articles and received a great deal of media attention. See,
e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975) (major feminist statement on the
crime of forcible rape); FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM AND THE OFFENDER
(D. Chappel, R. Geis & G. Geis eds. 1977) (compilation of articles by leading au-
thorities on many aspects of the problems surrounding sexual assault); Field &
Barnett, Forcible Rape: An Updated Bibliography, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
146 (1977) (bibliography listing 371 items). This literature and publicity led to a
public recognition of the seriousness of sexual assault. Much concern was gener-
ated about the inadequacy of institutional response to assault, and the insensitiv-
ity exhibited toward sexual assault victims by criminal justice agencies. As a
consequence, the laws and procedures governing the investigation, prosecution,
trial, and disposition of rape cases subsequently became a target of reform efforts.
As a result of these reform efforts, numerous programs and projects providing
training for professionals who provide services and assistance for victims were es-
tablished. Laws were enacted that redefined the crime of rape as sexual assault,
eliminated or restricted the definition of consent as a defense to rape, prohibited
or limited the admissibility of evidence about the victim's prior sexual conduct, re-
stricted the corroboration requirement, and changed the penalties for various
forms of sexual assault. See Brienen, Rape III-National Developments in Rape
Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 171, 207 (1980); Kneedler, Sexual As-
sault Law Reform in Virginia-A Legislative History, 68 VA. L. REv. 459 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Kneedler].
5. The first problem with respect to family violence to surface was the prob-
lem of the abused child. In the 1950's the "battered child syndrome" was identified
and reported in the medical literature; see Kempe, et al., The Battered Child Syn-
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drome, 181 A.M.A.J. 17 (1962). For a description of the nature and prevention of
child abuse and neglect, see generally D. GILL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN
(1972); HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS FAMILY (C. Kempe & R. Melfer eds.
1972); NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: VICTIM OF THE BATTERED CHILD (1981).
State legislatures reacted to concern about abused and neglected children by
passing laws requiring physicians and members of other groups to report sus-
pected cases of child abuse and neglect, establishing central registries for child
abuse reports, and strengthening the role of child protective agencies. For a re-
view and analysis of child abuse reporting laws and related legislation, see NA-
TIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE REPORTING LAWS (1978);
Schecter, The Violent Family and the Ambivalent State: Developing a Coherent
Policy for State Aid to Victims of Family Violence, 20 J. FAm. L. 1 (1981-82).
In the latter half of the 1970's, concern about family violence widened to include
the problem of the battered or abused spouse. Police, prosecutors and judges
were generally criticized on the ground that they failed to acknowledge the seri-
ousness of this problem and to deal with it accordingly. See generally R. GELLES,
FAMILY VIOLENCE (1979); R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING (1977); D. MARTIN,
BATTERED WIVES (1976); R. STRAUS & G. HOTALING, THE SOCIAL CAUSES OF HUS-
BAND AND WIFE VIOLENCE (1981); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN:
ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY (1981). The initiatives undertaken to aid victims of
spouse abuse include the creation of programs to provide services and assistance,
such as emergency shelters and counseling; the enactment of laws allowing vic-
tims to obtain protective orders and making violation of such orders a crime; and
litigation on behalf of victims against the police and other criminal justice system
personnel who have denied them adequate assistance. See generally Lerman, Pro-
tection of Battered Women: A Survey of State Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
271 (1980); Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 39 (1981).
6. Although the overall rate of criminal victimization of the elderly appears to
be less than that of the general population, the elderly may be more vulnerable to
crime than the general population. In addition, they are often less able than the
general population to cope with physical injuries, emotional trauma and financial
losses resulting from victimization. See generally CRIME AND THE ELDERLY (J.
Goldsmith & S. Goldsmith eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as CRIME AND THE ELD-
ERLY]; Goldsmith, The Elderly Victim and the Criminal Justice System: A Time for
Advocacy, in FORGOTTEN VICTIMS, supra note 1, at 145; Rifai, The Impact of Crime
on the Elderly: An Urban Crisis, in FORGOTTEN VICTIMS, supra note 1, at 151; Cle-
mente & Kleiman, Fear of Crime Among the Aged, 16 GERENTOLOGIST 207 (1976).
Concern about crimes against the elderly has led to the establishment of special
preventive programs, such as special police investigative units and assistance pro-
grams for elderly crime victims. See E. Younger, The California Experience in
Crime Prevention Programs with Senior Citizens in CRIME AND THE ELDERLY,
supra at 159; NEW YORK STATE CRIME VICTIM'S COMPENSATION BOARD, THE CRIME
VICTIM AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 89-90 (1982) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.
CRIME VICTIM REPORT].
State legislatures have also attempted to help the elderly. For example, some
states have enacted legislation increasing the penalties for crimes against the eld-
erly, prohibiting plea bargaining in cases involving the elderly, and creating a
criminal offense for abusing, neglecting or exploiting the elderly and for failure to
report such treatment. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
the victim of drunk driving 7-subsequently received similar atten-
tion. Concern about particular types of victims, however, has
gradually evolved into a general concern for all victims.
Efforts to improve the plight of crime victims have been broad,
ranging from attempts to make financial compensation and refer-
ral services more available to victims 8 to basic reform of criminal
laws and procedures. 9 A major focus of the victims' rights move-
VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. 4 (May
1983) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL.].
7. The growing concern about the victims of drunk drivers has spawned a
movement to strengthen the penalties for drunk driving and to secure vigorous en-
forcement of the laws. Organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD) and Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) have been in the forefront of this
movement. See States Toughen Drunk-Driving Laws, 13 CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETrER
6-7 (Feb. 15, 1982).
8. Many of the efforts to make financial compensation more available to
crime victims have involved the creation of state-operated victim compensation
programs. In 1965, California became the first state to enact a crime victim com-
pensation statute, and in 1966 New York followed suit. N.Y. CRIME VICTIM REPORT,
supra note 6, at 2. Today at least 38 states have crime victim compensation pro-
grams. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL., supra note 6, at 3. For a survey and
analysis of compensation statutes and programs, see generally NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION (D. Carrow
ed. 1980); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME VICTIM
COMPENSATION-PROGRAM MODEL (D. Carrow ed. 1980); Rizel, A Survey of 27 Vic-
tim Compensation Programs, 63 JUDICATURE 485 (1980). There have also been ef-
forts to make financial assistance more available to crime victims through
expansion of restitution in criminal cases. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying
text.
In addition, there has been an increase in victim suits aimed at establishing
third-party liability for negligent victimization. See generally Carrington, Victims'
Rights. A New Tort, 14 TRIAL MAG. 39 (1978); Aynes, Government Responsibility
and the Right Not to be a Victim, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. Symposium (1984). To
further monetary civil remedies for crime victims, laws have been enacted provid-
ing that income realized by a criminal offender from an offense is to be held in
escrow. Damages awarded the victim in a civil tort suit then may be paid out of
such funds. E.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 632-a (Consol. Supp. 1982); see also Harland,
Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of Criminal
Courts, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 52, 67 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Harland].
Recognition that many victims need social and medical services in coping with
the impact of victimization, as well as financial assistance, has led to the establish-
ment and expansion of victim service programs. These programs may provide di-
rect or referral services to victims, which may be short-term crisis intervention
programs or long term services. See generally EVALUATING VICTIM SERVICES (S.
Salaisin ed. 1981). Victim services may be provided through victim-witness assist-
ance program units in prosecutors' offices, other criminal justice agencies, or in-
dependent agencies. See generally M. BARD & D. SANDREY, THE CRIME VICTIM'S
BOOK 142, 198-207 (1979); R. KNUDTEN, A. MEADE, M. KNUDTEN & W. DOERNER, VIC-
TIMS AND WITNESSES: THE IMPACT OF CRIME AND THEIR EXPERIENCE wITH THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 44 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KNUDTEN]. See also infra
note 12.
9. For example, the 1982 California Victims' Bill of Rights (Proposition 8), an
initiative encompassing a statute and constitutional amendment, contains a
number of provisions which address the basic structure and operation of the crim-
inal justice system. Proposition 8 prohibits plea bargaining in certain classes of
cases, eliminates the criminal defense of diminished capacity, limits the insanity
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ment has been the role of victims in criminal proceedings. At the
present time, such proceedings involve only two official parties:
the state, as represented by the public prosecutor, and the de-
fendant. The victim's role is defined as that of a witness, not a
party. This limitation of the victim's role is an outgrowth of the
characterization of the harm resulting from the crime and the
purpose of criminal prosecution. As one commentator has
explained:
Crime is regarded as offense against the state. The damage to the individ-
ual victim is incidental and its redress is no longer regarded as a function
of the criminal justice process .... The criminal justice system is not for
his benefit but for the community's. Its purposes are to deter crime, reha-
bilitate criminals, punish criminals, and do justice, but not to restore vic-
tims to their wholeness or vindicate them.1 0
Beginning about a decade ago, a concern began to develop
about the treatment of crime victims in their role as witnesses as
well as other witnesses in criminal proceedings." This concern
defense, restricts the exclusion of evidence from criminal proceedings on grounds
distinct from the federal constitution, authorizes the use of any prior felony con-
viction in any criminal proceeding for impeachment purposes, and authorizes the
use of prior felony convictions for purposes of enhancing the sentence of a crimi-
nal offender. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS A. & CENTER FOR CRIM. JUSTICE POL-
ICY & MANAGEMENT, PROPOSITION 8, THE VICTIM'S BILL OF RIGHTS 1-6 (1982). See
also supra notes 3, 4 & 6.
10. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL
295-29 (R. Barnett & J. Hasel eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ASSESSING THE
CRIMINAL].
11. See, e.g., WITNESS COOPERATION, 9-17 (F. Cannavale, Jr. & W. Falcon eds.
1976); KNUDTEN, VICTIM PROBLEMS AND PERCEPTIONS, supra note 1; KNUDTEN,
supra note 8. In 1972, one observer summarized the treatment of victims and wit-
nesses within the criminal justice system as follows:
In the typical situation the witness will several times be ordered to ap-
pear at some designated place, usually a courtroom, but sometimes a pros-
ecutor's office or grand jury room. Several times he will be made to wait
tedious, unconscionably long intervals of time in dingy courthouse corri-
dors or in other grim surroundings. Several times he will suffer the dis-
comfort of being ignored by busy officials and the bewilderment and
painful anxiety of not knowing what is going on around him or what is go-
ing to happen to him. On most of these occasions he will never be asked
to testify or to give anyone any information, often because of a last-minute
adjournment granted in a huddled conference at the judge's bench. He
will miss many hours from work (or school) and consequently will lose
many hours of wages. In most jurisdictions he will receive at best only to-
ken payment in the form of ridiculously low witness fees for his time and
trouble. In many metropolitan areas he will, in fact, receive no recom-
pense at all because he will be told neither that he is entitled to fees nor
how to get them. Through the long months of waiting for the end of a
criminal case, he must remain ever on call, reminded of his continuing at-
tachment to the court by sporadic subpoenas. For some, each subpoena
and each appearance at court is accompanied by tension and terror
has led to various initiatives designed to ease the burdens of testi-
fying in criminal cases. These initiatives include the establish-
ment of victim/witness assistance programs to assist victims in
dealing with the criminal justice process,12 the protection of vic-
tims and witnesses from intimidation intended to discourage co-
operation with the prosecution of criminal cases,13 the reduction
and prompt notification of scheduling changes which affect the at-
tendance of victims and witnesses at criminal proceedings, 14 the
payment of higher fees for witnesses, 15 the protection of victims
prompted by fear of the lawyers, fear of the defendant or his friends, and
fear of the unknown. In sum, the experience is dreary, time-wasting, de-
pressing, exhausting, confusing, frustrating, numbing and seemingly
endless.
Ash, supra note 1, at 390.
12. In the early 1970's the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) launched an initiative to federally fund victim/witness programs, and by
1979 more than 90 victim/witness assistance projects were funded. The goal of this
initiative was to improve the treatment of victims and witnesses within the crimi-
nal justice system, in an attempt to produce greater cooperation in the investiga-
tion and prosecution of criminal cases. The National District Attorneys
Association, funded with a grant from LEAA, created the Commission on Victim-
Witness Assistance and has taken the lead in promoting victim-witness assistance
units in prosecutors' offices. For a description and evaluation of various vic-
tim/witness assistance projects, see generally PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 121-25; NATIONAL DIST. A'lr'Y Ass'N COMMISSION ON VICTIM Wrr-
NESS ASSISTANCE, HELP FOR VICTIMS AND WITNESSES (1976); VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF THE VICTIM/WITNESS ASSISTANCE PROJECT'S COURT
BASED SERVICES (1976); VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, AN IMPACT EVALUATION OF
THE VICTIM-WITNESS ASSISTANCE PROJECT'S APPEARANCE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
(1975).
Several states have enacted legislation institutionalizing and funding victim-wit-
ness assistance units. See ABA, SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE VICTIM/WITNESS
LEGISLATION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS, 77-84 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as ABA, VICTIM/WITNESS LEGISLATION]. See also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 37, 47-49 (recommending that Congress enact legislation pro-
viding federal funding for victim-witness agencies and that the federal government
establish a resource center for victim and witness assistance).
13. In 1979 the American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section, Commit-
tee on Victims held hearings on victim-witness problems and developed a model
statute to protect victims and witnesses from intimidation and retaliation. ABA,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, VICTIMS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS (June 4
& 5, 1979); ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, VICTIMS COMMITTEE, REDUCING VIC-
TIM/WITNESS INTIMIDATION: A PACKAGE (1981). This model statute has served as
the basis of some of the provisions of the recently enacted Federal Victim and
Witness Protection Act and state legislation. See S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 2515; BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULL., supra note 6, at 3. See also State Legislation In Aid of Victims
and Witnesses of Crime, 10 J. LEGIS. 394 (1983) (discussion of elements of model
statute); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 63, 66-67; ABA, CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SECTION, GUIDELINES FOR FAIR TREATMENT OF CRIME VICTIMS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES 1, 7-8 (approved by ABA House of Delegates, Aug. 1983) (hereinafter cited
as ABA GUIDELINES].
14. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 67-68, 74-77; ABA
GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 1, 8.
15. Florida, Nebraska and Nevada have enacted legislation substantially in-
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and witnesses from being dismissed or penalized by their employ-
ers because of absenteeism caused by participation in criminal
proceedings,16 the expedited return to victims of recovered prop-
erty which constitutes evidence in criminal proceedings,'7 and the
use of depositions of victims and witnesses in lieu of court ap-
pearances in certain types of cases.' 8
Increasingly, demands are being made not only for better treat-
ment of victims as witnesses, but also for expansion of the role of
the victim beyond that of a witness. The limitation of the victim's
role to that of a witness has typically meant that they have little
formal input into or control of the criminal litigation process or its
outcome. As one authority has observed:
[The victim's] injury becomes the occasion for a public course of action,
but he has no "standing" to compel prosecution of the crime against him
or to contest decisions to dismiss or reduce the charges or to accept plea
bargains, or to challenge the sentence imposed on the offender who in-
jured him, or to participate in hearings on restitution.
The prosecutor need not tell him whether a charge has been filed or why
it has been reduced from the offense complained of to a lesser one.
Neither prosecutor nor judge need advise him of the terms of plea ar-
rangements or sentences. And little or nothing need be done in the crimi-
nal case to facilitate his obtaining financial compensation for his
creasing witness fees for court appearances, and similar bills are pending in other
states. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL., supra note 6, at 3; ABA
VICTIM/WITNESS LEGISLATION, supra note 12, at 53-57.
16. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 108-09. ABA GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 13, at 2, 8-9. In Oklahoma, Washington and Wisconsin, statutory
victims' Bills of Rights grant victims and witnesses the right to employer interces-
sion services in order to discourage employers from penalizing employees who
must make court appearances by withholding pay or other benefits. In Illinois,
New York and Wisconsin, legislation has been enacted prohibiting employers from
dismissing or penalizing an employee who is absent from work in response to a
subpoena in a criminal case. ABA, VICTIM/WITNESS LEGISLATION, supra note 12, at
56-58; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL., supra note 6, at 3.
17. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 57, 59-60, 63, 68-69, 73,
81; ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 3, 17. Kansas has enacted legislation which
provides that a photograph of recovered property is admissible if a description of
the property is handwritten on the picture under oath by the investigating officer.
Once so photographed, the property can be returned to the victim/owner. ABA
VICTIM/WITNESS LEGISLATION, supra note 12, at 37-38.
18. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17, 21-22. In Con-
necticut, Florida, Missouri and New York, legislation encouraging the use of depo-
sitions in lieu of courtroom appearances for designated classes of cases, such as
those involving sexual battery, child abuse, and mentally disturbed or seriously in-
jured witnesses, has been enacted. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS BULL., supra
note 6, at 4. See ABA VICTIM/WITNESS LEGISLATION, supra note 12, at 50-52.
injuries.1 9
In recent years, crime victims' rights advocates have urged that
victims be given the right to more fully participate in criminal
proceedings, and there does appear to be a noticeable trend in the
direction of greater victim participation in criminal actions. One
of the specific proposals made in this regard is that the victim be
informed of the status of the case at various stages in the criminal
justice process, 20 and such proposals have been implemented in
some jurisdictions. 2 1 There have also been proposals to ensure
that the victim's interests are known and considered in decisions
affecting those interests by prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges. For example, it has been proposed that victims have the
opportunity to make their views known concerning negotiated
guilty pleas. 22 It has also been suggested that victim-impact state-
ments be used in the sentencing of convicted offenders and that
victims be given the right of allocution at sentencing hearings, 23
and such proposals are beginning to be implemented in some
jurisdictions. 24
Some victims' rights advocates have gone beyond the aforemen-
tioned proposals and suggest that victims be allowed to initiate
criminal actions 25 and be represented by counsel at trial, at least
under some circumstances. 26 Perhaps the most sweeping propo-
sal made to date is that of the President's Task Force on Victims
of Crime, which recommended the adoption of a federal constitu-
tional amendment stating that "the victim in every criminal pros-
ecution shall have the right to be present and to be heard at all
critical stages of judicial proceedings." 27
Despite the activity in this area, there is surprisingly little
scholarly literature on the role of the victim in a criminal proceed-
ing, and little thought appears to have been devoted to the con-
struction of a coherent and consistent conceptual rationale for a
restructuring of the victim's role. It is the purpose of this article
to provide an overview of the issues and problems raised by ex-
panding the victim's role at various stages of criminal proceed-
ings. More specifically, this article explores the justifications for
19. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss.
L.J. 515, 519-20 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
20. See infra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 170-83 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 170-83.
25. See infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
27. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 114-115.
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expanding the victim's role and the feasibility and desirability of
such expansion.
The article is divided into five sections: Part II describes the
historical evolution of the role of the victim in a criminal action;
Part III identifies the victim's interests and the systemic and soci-
etal interests which might justify expanding the role of the victim;
Part IV deals with the implications of expanding the victim's role
in terms of decision-making at several stages of the criminal pro-
cess; Part V discusses the extent to which legal systems of other
countries might provide models for an expansion of the role of the
victim; and Part VI addresses alternatives to the criminal action,
such as mediation and arbitration, which might better meet vic-
tims' needs.
II. THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING: THE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In assessing efforts to expand the role of the crime victim in a
criminal proceeding, it is useful at the outset to examine how and
why the victim's role came to be narrowly defined as a non-party
witness. Even though there has been a growing interest in crime
victims, the crime victim has been largely overlooked as a subject
of historical research. There are, however, historical studies relat-
ing to the public prosecution of criminal offenders and the use of
restitution which provide insights into the historical evolution of
the crime victim's role in the criminal proceeding.
A. Emergence of a System of Public Prosecution
The current limitation of the role of the crime victim to that of
witness is partly the result of the emergence of a system of public
prosecution during the American colonial period and its subse-
quent development. By the time of the American Revolution, all
of the original thirteen colonies were under English political con-
trol and had been populated largely by English colonists who
brought with them the English common law tradition. When the
colonies were being settled in the seventeenth century, the Eng-
lish system of criminal prosecut'on was primarily a system of pri-
vate prosecution, where the victim or interested individual had
the right to bring and prosecute the case against a criminal of-
fender.28 Although it is difficult to generalize about colonial crimi-
nal prosecutions because of the differences between the colonies
and the paucity of historical research, 29 the system in most of the
colonies resembled the English system of private prosecution.3O
During this period, however, a public prosecution function devel-
oped which gradually superceded the private system, and the
public prosecutor became predominantly an officer of local
government. 31
28. See generally Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25
AM. U.L. REV. 754, 756-62 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment] (concise descrip-
tion of the history of private prosecution in England). See also 1 J. CHITTY, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 1-10 (1847); 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 493-503 (1883) [hereinafter cited as J. STEPHEN]; 4
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 6 (1931) [hereinaf-
ter cited as WICKERSHAM COMMISSION].
29. The most extensive studies of the historical development of the American
public prosecutor during the colonial period have been done by Jack Kress and
Joan Jacoby. See Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 ANNALS 99 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Kress]; J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDEN-
TITY 3-39 (1980) [hereinafter cited as J. JACOBY].
30. See J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at xvii, 10; McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial
Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649,
651-54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as McDonald].
31. The Virginia experience is an illustration of the process by which private
prosecution was superceded by local public prosecution. In Virginia, the first col-
ony to be settled, the office of public prosecutor began in 1643 with the appoint-
ment of a King's attorney to represent the interests of the English Crown in the
colony's courts. This officer, who was in effect Virginia's first attorney-general, ac-
ted as an advisor to the general court and later to the oyer and terminer courts.
Most of his duties originally involved ascertaining the law through correspondence
with legal authorities in England. His participation in criminal prosecutions was
initially confined to cases directly involving the royal interest but later expanded
to serious criminal cases. During the late 1600's, special deputy attorneys general
were occasionally appointed in some counties; in 1687, the attorney general, at the
direction of the General Court, nominated deputy attorneys general for the county
courts; and by 1711, deputy attorneys general were appointed by the Governor,
upon the recommendation of the attorney general. The powers and responsibili-
ties of these deputy attorneys general gradually increased, and in 1751 all accusers
and witnesses were required to consult with a deputy attorney before filing com-
plaints or affidavits in a criminal case, placing him in a position to review and in-
fluence the charging process. See 0. CHrrWOOD, JUSTICE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 120-
21 (1971); J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 13; H. RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 55 (1965) [hereinafter cited as H.
RANKIN]; A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 66, 80 (1930).
The Connecticut experience provides another example bf the growth of the pub-
lic prosecutor function and its replacement of private prosecution. Like Virginia,
Connecticut had a King's or Queen's Attorney. The earliest such attorney was ap-
pointed in 1602 at Hartford. In 1704, however, Connecticut established local public
prosecutors in all county courts and became the first colony entirely to do away
with the system of private prosecution. See J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 16; see
also B. GROSMAN, THE PROSECUTOR: AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
136 (1969) [hereinafter cited as B. GROSMAN]. For experiences in some of the
other colonies, see generally J. GOEBEL & R. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CO-
LONIAL NEW YORK 324-383 (1944) [hereinafter cited as J. GOEBEL & R. NAUGHTON];
E. PAGE, JUDICIAL BEGINNINGS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 59-60, 102-11 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as E. PAGE]; R. SEMMES, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND 21-40
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The derivation of the office of the American public prosecutor
as it evolved during the colonial period is something of an histori-
cal enigma. The most logical source of the American public pros-
ecution function would seem to be the English common law
tradition inasmuch as American colonial law in most areas was
based upon the English law. Since, however, at the time of the
American colonization, the English system of criminal prosecu-
tion was primarily a system of private prosecution, the American
system of public prosecution would not appear to be attributable
to English legal influences.
Nevertheless, it has frequently been asserted that the American
public prosecutor could be traced to certain incipient elements in
the English common law tradition. For example, it has been as-
serted that the American public prosecutor was modeled after the
English attorney general.3 2 The difficulty with this assertion is
that the English attorney general conducted prosecutions only to
protect the Crown's interest in a relatively few serious criminal
cases, and the English Director of Public Prosecutions, which is
the closest analog to the American public prosecutor, was not es-
tablished until 1879, well after the appearance of the public prose-
cutor in the American colonies. 33 There are also other theories
about the possible English common law origins of the American
public prosecutor but these theories are highly speculative in
nature.34
(1958) [hereinafter cited as R. SEMMES]; Farrell, The Early History of Rhode Is-
land's Court System, 9 R.I. HIST. 65, 70-71, 108-10 (1950).
32. See WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 6; Kress, supra note 29, at
100; see also J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 4 (discrediting this view).
33. For a concise description of the history and operation of the British Office
of the Director of Public Prosecutions, see generally R.M. JACKSON, THE MACHIN-
ERY OF JUSTCE IN ENGLAND 86-88 (7th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as R.M. JACK-
SON). It should be noted that the system of private prosecution was not
eliminated by the establishment of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution
and that private prosecutions can be and are still brought in England. See infra
notes 187-200 and accompanying text.
34. It has been suggested that the early English justices of the peace per-
formed a prosecutorial-type role in cases of serious crime and that the American
public prosecutor might be modeled after these officials. This theory is based
upon the research of Professor John Langbein, who found that in the sixteenth
century, justices of the peace assumed investigatory and forensic functions similar
to those of the modern public prosecutor, as well as magisterial functions in seri-
ous felony cases. See Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common
Law, 17 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 313 (1973). Professor Kress has pointed out that these
officials were "firmly established by the time of the American colonization," and
that "the appearance of a separate public prosecutor in the colonies might be ex-
Another possible source of the American system of public pros-
ecution is the Dutch schout. 35 The Dutch colony of New Nether-
lands took in portions of what later became, under English
control, the colonies of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Del-
aware, and Connecticut with the most populous Dutch settle-
ment, now New York City. The Dutch brought with them to their
American colonies their legal institutions including the schout, a
public official who combined the powers and duties of a sheriff
and public prosecutor.36 When the English wrested final control
of New Netherlands from the Dutch, and English common law be-
came the controlling law in the former Dutch settlements, the ti-
tle of schout disappeared in these settlements-but it appears
that some of his functions were carried on through the office of
sheriff.37 Yet it is questionable whether it was the Dutch influ-
plained as a fairly logical next step, that is, a pragmatic division of the separate
magisterial and prosecutorial functions." Kress, supra note 29, at 102. Kress, how-
ever, goes on to point out that "more research is certainly required before we may
support such a so far undocumented claim of influence upon the colonies." Id.
In addition, it has been suggested that the concept of the American office of the
public prosecutor might be drawn from various English proposals for a public sys-
tem of prosecution that began to be made in the sixteenth century. As early as
1534, King Henry VIII criticized the system of private prosecutor because it led to
imperfect execution of the penal laws and proposed that sergeants of the Com-
monwealth act as prosecutors to enforce penal laws throughout the country. See
B. GROSMAN, supra note 31, at 10. Criticism of the system of private prosecutions
and proposals for public prosecutors continued to be made periodically until 1879
when the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions was created. For a legisla-
tive history of proposals for public prosecution, see Kurland & Waters, Public Pros-
ecutions in England, 1854-79: An Essay in English Legislative History, 4 DUKE L.J.
493 (1959); P. HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 58-85 (1931). Here again,
however, the available historical evidence does not reveal any nexus between
such proposals and the growth of the American system of public prosecution.
Kress, supra note 29, at 101.
35. M. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr. originally propounded the thesis that the Ameri-
can public prosecutor was a legacy of the Dutch administration of the New
Netherlands and, more particularly of the Dutch schout. Comment, The District
Attorney - A Historical Puzzle, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 125 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
Van Alstyne Comment]. See also Kress, supra note 29.
36. In about 1655, New Amsterdam became the first Dutch settlement to estab-
lish the office of schout. The office of schout was also established in the settle-
ments of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. See Van Alstyne Comment,
supra note 35, at 130-31, 133-35. The schout had some arrest powers, was involved
in the collection of evidence, notified the accused of the charges against him and
acted as a prosecutor in court. See J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 14; Van Alstyne
Comment, supra note 35, at 129-31, 133-35.
37. J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 14-15; Van Alstyne Comment, supra note 35, at
132-37. The New Netherlands have a complicated history because of alternating
Dutch and English administrations of the colony. While the New Netherlands was
first settled by the Dutch, the English claimed the lands comprising New Nether-
lands. In 1664 the English captured New Amsterdam and took over the New
Netherlands colony. The Dutch retook the colony in 1673, but the English
regained control in 1674. During the period of British control from 1664 to 1673, the
English governor promulgated a code of law, establishing the English system of
law and governance. The Dutch schout, however, remained in office and continued
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ence that was the predominant influence in producing the Ameri-
can public prosecutor, in view of the fact that the Dutch
population outside of New Amsterdam was small, that Dutch con-
trol over its colonies was brief, and that the public prosecutor had
developed earlier in colonies where the Dutch had neither settle-
ments nor influence. 38
Another claimed civil law source of the American public prose-
cutor is the French concept of public prosecution which was insti-
tutionalized in the form of the French prosecutor de roi and which
was well established in France by the American colonial period.39
The 1931 landmark Wicksham Report on Prosecution, which as-
serted that French influence had shaped the institution of the
American public prosecutor, stated that this influence stemmed
from post-revolutionary rejection of English institutions and en-
thusiasm for French institutions. 40 However, this argument ig-
nores the fact that the American public prosecutor took firm root
during the colonial period.4 1
In addition to the aforementioned claims about the origin of the
American public prosecutor which focus upon its possible Eng-
lish, Dutch, and French antecedents, there is another explana-
tion-namely, that the office is largely a result of an American
colonial environment and experience that led the colonies to cre-
ate a unique form of prosecution, or at least adapt existing forms
of prosecution in a unique manner. One commentator has specu-
lated that "[f] or the colonists, bound together by the overriding
need to conquer a foreign and alien environment, the focus on the
to prosecute cases. After the English took permanent control of the colony in 1674,
the records of the New Amsterdam courts used sheriffs as public prosecutors,
from which it might by inferred that "the role of schout passed to the sheriff." Van
Alsyne Comment, supra note 35, at 136. There is some evidence in court and other
colonial records suggesting that a similar process may have occurred in courts in
Bergen, New Jersey, Newcastle, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, which were origi-
nally part of the Dutch colony of New Netherlands. See Van Alstyne Comment,
supra note 35, at 132-37.
38. See Kress, supra note 29, at 104. See also J. GOEBEL & R. NAUGHTON, supra
note 31, at 332-33. Goebel and Naughton, who did the leading study of law enforce-
ment in colonial New York, state that it cannot be assumed that "the development
of a public prosecutor was merely an adaptation of Dutch usage," particularly
since there were other possible models for the practice of having a public official
conduct criminal prosecutions. Id. at 332.
39. See WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 7; see also J. JACOBY,
supra note 29, at 4; Kress, supra note 29, at 102-03.
40. WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 7.
41. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. See also J. JACOBY, supra
note 29, at 4; Kress, supra note 29, at 103.
survival of the colony may have given rise to the concept of public
protection" which in turn gave rise to the public prosecutor.42
A system of public prosecution might also have been perceived
as more consistent than a system of private prosecution with the
colonial commitment to a more democratic society. Under a sys-
tem of private prosecution, the prosecution of criminal offenses
depends upon the ability and willingness of the victim or other in-
terested individuals to bring prosecutions, which the poor and
powerless are less able and willing to do. Accordingly, one of the
reasons for establishing the office of public prosecutor might have
been to ensure that poor victims as well as rich victims would be
able to obtain redress for crimes committed against them or their
property.43
Moreover, there were problems associated with private prosecu-
tions to which the development of the American office of the pub-
lic prosecutor may well have been a response. Thus, the fact that
a system of private prosecution depended upon the ability and
willingness of victims and other private individuals to prosecute
undoubtedly meant the sometimes uncertain and ineffective en-
forcement of the penal laws."
Furthermore, the system of private prosecution produced cer-
tain abuses, such as compounding. 45 Under the system of private
prosecution, informers who reported criminal offenses to the
42. J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 17.
43. The English system of private prosecution was repeatedly criticized on the
ground that the poor could not afford the expense of bringing a private prosecu-
tion. One historian commented:
[T]ill about a century ago private persons had to pay all the costs of every
prosecution. This was complained of by Lord Hale . . . . Fielding in his
essay on the causes of the increase of robberies, repeats and enforces this
complaint. The extreme poverty of prosecutors, he says is one cause of
the escape of offenders.
J. STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 498.
Another historian concluded that the old English system of private prosecution
was "a part of a system of a government by the rich and for the rich," and stated:
The colonists' substantial adaption of the machinery of criminal justice as
administered by the English justices of the peace was apparently deliber-
ate. It was what they were used to, and, as the system was developed ini-
tially in Massachusetts, it provided wide latitude for the exercise of
magisterial discretion; consequently, it comported well with the leaders'
ideas about the functions of government and law . . . indeed it worked
even more successfully in the colonies partly because the community was
small ....
D. CAMPBELL, THE PURITAN IN HOLLAND, ENGLAND AND AMERICA 444 (1899) (quoted
in J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 13).
44. See McDonald, supra note 30, at 653-54; see also supra note 34.
45. For example, historical records indicate that the Virginia Governor's ap-
pointment in 1711 of deputy attorneys general as prosecuting attorneys for the Vir-
ginia county courts was done to insure the cessation of compounding. See 0.
CHrrWOOD, supra note 31, at 120.
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courts and prosecuted the offenders received a percentage of the
fine imposed with the remainder of the fine going to the Crown.
The practice of compounding involved the payment of a negoti-
ated percentage of the anticipated fine to the informer by the of-
fender in return for the informer's agreement not to report or not
to prosecute the offense. This practice was viewed as a serious
problem because it undermined the impact of the criminal laws
and deprived colonial courts of needed revenue. There is also
some evidence that the public prosecutor was seen as a protec-
tion against other abuses, such as malicious prosecutions. 46
After the colonial period, the office of public prosecutor contin-
ued to develop until it reached its present position of great stat-
ure and authority. One of the most significant changes which
occurred in the course of its development was its shift from an ap-
pointive office to an elective one.4 7 The impetus for this shift was
the democratization of the American body politic which began in
the 1820's, was highlighted by the election of Andrew Jackson in
1828, and continued up to the Civil War.
A change also occurred in the characterization of the public
prosecutor as a judicial official. The public prosecutor became a
member of the executive, rather than the judicial, branch of gov-
ernment and the judicial and prosecutorial functions were clearly
separated. 48 The local public prosecutor's status as a member of
the executive branch of government combined with his status as
an elected official served to consolidate prosecutorial power and
discretion in the office of the public prosecutor.
A concomitant of the emergence of public prosecution during
the colonial period, and its subsequent development, was a rejec-
tion-in theory and practice-of private prosecution. While ves-
tiges of private prosecution in an attenuated form remain in some
jurisdictions, it constitutes something of an anomaly where it
does exist.49 The rise of a system of public prosecution at the ex-
pense of private prosecution has directly affected the role of the
victim in a criminal proceeding. It has meant that the local public
46. J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 18.
47. In 1932, Mississippi became the first state to adopt a constitutional provi-
sion for the popular election of local district attorneys, and almost all states subse-
quently made provision for a popularly elected local prosecutor either in their
constitutions or statutes. See J. JACOBY, supra note 29, at 19-28.
48. Id. at 25-27.
49. See infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
prosecutor rather than the victim initiates and controls the prose-
cution, and as a result, the victim's role has become limited to
that of a witness in the criminal proceeding.O
B. The Decline of Restitution
The current limitation of the role of the victim in the criminal
proceeding to that of a witness is traceable not only to the emer-
gence and development of a system of public prosecution, but
also to the decline of restitution as a criminal sanction. While the
term "restitution" has been defined in a number of ways, as used
here the term refers to the payment of money or services by the
offender as compensation for financial losses or injuries caused
by crime.5 1
Restitution as a criminal sanction in Anglo-American law has
its roots in practices in England during the Anglo-Saxon period.
The very long and complicated history of restitution may be
briefly summarized as consisting of the following major stages:
"Private vengeance, collective vengeance and the blood feud, a
system of composition or restitution, and the displacement of the
system of offender restitution by the sovereign."5 2
The history of restitution in America is a variation on this
theme. During the colonial period, a variety of punishments were
imposed for criminal offenses, many of them quite harsh by pres-
ent day standards. Among the common criminal sanctions were
50. The culmination of this process can be seen in Connecticut, the first col-
ony to substitute a system for private prosecution in 1704. Writing in 1927, a Con-
necticut judge declared:
In all criminal cases in Connecticut, the state is the prosecutor. The of-
fenses are against the state. The victim of the offense is not a party to the
prosecution, nor does he occupy any relation to it other than that of a wit-
ness, an interested witness, perhaps, but nonetheless, only a witness. It is
not required for the injured party to make a complaint, nor is he required
to give bond to prosecute. He is in no sense a relator. He cannot in any
way control the prosecution and whether reluctant or not, he can be com-
pelled like any other witness to appear and testify.
Pickett, The Office of Prosecutor in Connecticut, 17 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 348,
356-57 (1927).
51. See A. HARLAND, RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD
CRIMES 1-2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF PERSONAL AND
HOUSEHOLD CRIMES]. For a description of statutory definitions using the term
"restitution" see Harland, supra note 8, at 60-66. For a typology of restitution for-
mats see Siegel, Court Ordered Victim-Restitution: An Overview of Theory and Ac-
tion, 5 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 135-136 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Siegel].
52. Hudson and Galaway, Introduction in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7
(J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTITUTION]. For a con-
cise description of the history of restitution see Jacob, The Concept of Restitution:
An Historical Overview in RESTITUTION, supra at 45. See also S. SHAFER, THE VIC-
TIM AND HIS CRIMINAL 7-38 (1968); Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its
Past History and an Analysis of its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71-79
(1970).
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the death penalty, corporal punishment, the pillory, the admoni-
tion, the local gaol, the workhouse, fines, and last but not least,
restitution. 53 Colonial records indicate that restitution was the
basic penalty for theft, along with other punishments, throughout
the colonies. 54
The decline of restitution in America began in the late eight-
eenth century after the Revolution with the advent of the peniten-
tiary. In the late 1700's, the first state penitentiaries were opened
in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York, and by the 1820's,
there were penitentiaries throughout the states of the North-
east. 55 As penitentiaries were established, incarceration became
the prevailing penalty for many crimes which had previously sub-
jected the offender to a variety of older sanctions such as
restitution. 56
53. See generally G. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA 83-230 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as G. DALZELL]; L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 60-65
(1973); J. GOEBEL & R. NAUGHTON, supra note 31, at 701-10; G. HASKINS, LAW AND
AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 175 (1960) [hereinafter cited as G. HASKINS] ;
E. PAGE, supra note 31, at 117-33; H. RANKIN, supra note 31, at 124-229; R. SEMMES,
supra note 31, at 38-40; A. ScOTT, supra note 31, at 152-323; C. Ellefson, The County
Courts and the Provincial Court in Maryland, 1733-63 299-309 (1963) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation) [hereinafter cited as C. Ellefson]; Hirsch, From Pillory to Peni-
tentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 1179, 1180, 1223-28 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hirsch].
54. See generally G. DALZELL, supra note 53, at 15-58, 168, 171, 187, 209, 256; G.
HASKINS, supra note 53, at 153-54, 175; A. ScoTT, supra note 31, at 226-27; R.
SEMMES, supra note 31, at 56; C. Ellefson, supra note 53, at 436-43.
Perhaps the most extensively studied colony with respect to crime and punish-
ment was the Puritan colony of Massachusetts Bay, and these studies furnish
some interesting insights into the function and use of restitution during the colo-
nial period. The law and practice with respect to restitution in theft cases was an
amalgam of English common law precedents and Biblical prescriptions. Prior to
1646, the magistrate had discretionary power to fashion sanctions for theft, but in
1646, and later in 1736, statutes were enacted which specified penalties for the theft
offenses. Under the 1736 theft statute, the punishment for theft was a session on
the gallows with a rope around the neck, a whipping, and treble damages payable
to the victim. If offenders were unable to pay damages, they could be sold into
service, either to the victim or a third party, to work off the damage judgment.
Servants found guilty of stealing from their masters could be required to pay mon-
etary damages or forced to serve beyond their stipulated term of service, and since
few servants probably had the funds to pay damages, an additional period of serv-
ice was undoubtedly the more typical method of punishment. G. HASKINS, supra
note 53, at 153; Hirsch, supra note 53, at 1227-28. See also Nelson, Emerging No-
tions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspec-
tive, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 93, 104-08 (R. Quinney ed. 1974).
55. D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 61 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as D. ROTHMAN]; Hirsch, supra note 53, at 1191; McDonald, supra note 30, at 657 &
n.41.
56. The well documented Massachusetts experience again provides a good ex-
Differing explanations have been offered for the rise of the peni-
tentiary and criminal incarceration which was associated with the
decline of restitution. 57 While further historical research is neces-
ample of this trend. In 1785, Massachusetts enacted legislation establishing its
first prison on Castle Island in Boston harbor and providing for labor on Castle
Island as a punishment for twenty-four crimes, including several theft offenses. A
sentence to hard labor on Castle Island initially was an alternative to, rather than
a substitute for, the imposition of other older sanctions. Thus, Castle Island incar-
ceration was not to be imposed for theft unless the old sanction of payment of
treble damages to the victim was unworkable, but use of incarceration gradually
expanded, the courts began to impose the penalty of incarceration for theft even
in cases where the old penalty of treble damages could be used. In 1805, a new
and larger prison was opened in Charleston, and a new penal code was enacted
which made all crimes punishable by fines, incarceration, or the death penalty,
and which eliminated the provision for offender payment of treble damages to the
victim in theft crimes. Hirsch, supra note 53, at 1246-47, 1249-50; McDonald, supra
note 30, at 657-58; Nelson, supra note 54, at 108-09.
57. David Rothman's well known work, The Discovery of the Asylum, traces
these developments to a post-revolutionary penal and correctional reform move-
ment which swept America after the revolution. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 55.
Rothman asserts that, during the colonial period, the purpose of criminal punish-
ment was viewed as expiatory and retributive, a view reflecting religious precepts
and influences. He further asserts that this view of the purpose of criminal pun-
ishment did not dictate the widespread use of incarceration. He maintains that,
after the Revolution, Americans, faced with increasing crime and receptive to pe-
nal and correctional reform, were influenced by the concepts of the European En-
lightenment, particularly the criminological philosophy of Cesare Beccaria.
Beccaria believed that there was a causal connection between the increase in
crime and harsh and inconsistent penal codes; that punishment should be utilita-
rian; and that therefore deterrence or the prevention of future crime rather than
objectives such as restitution should be the purpose of punishment. According to
Rothman, the deterrence approach to criminal punishment propounded by Bec-
caria became the initial justification for incarceration. Rothman's further thesis is
that, by the Jacksonian period in the 1820's, social conditions had become identi-
fied as the chief cause of crime, that rehabilitation consequently had replaced de-
terrence as the articulated purpose for punishment, and that incarceration was
seen as promoting rehabilitation of offenders by removing them from their cor-
rupting environments.
Although Rothman's interpretation of the rise of the penitentiary and criminal
incarceration has been highly influential, it has been recently criticized on the
ground that it does not comport with the historical evidence. Adam Hirsch has
put forth another explanation for the rise of the penitentiary and criminal incar-
ceration based upon a study of these developments in late eighteenth century
Massachusetts. Hirsch, supra note 53. Hirsch locates the impetus for these devel-
opments in a series of demographic and social changes. Seventeenth century
Massachusetts consisted of small, tightly knit communities with non-mobile popu-
lations and the emphasis in dealing with criminal offenders, most of whom were
lifelong residents of the community, was to use "criminal sanctions which would
draw the resident back into the community through rehabilitation, deterrence and
an expression of community forgiveness." Id. at 1223-24. The seventeenth century
Massachusetts magistrates, however, did not ignore the victim for there was a rec-
ognition that victim and offender could return to their customary roles when the
breach between them was healed. In the eighteenth century, Massachusetts un-
derwent a rapid growth in its population, the mobility of its population increased,
and by the middle 1800's there was "a small but significant floating population of
men and women at the bottom of society who moved from seaport to seaport and
town to town in search of work." Id. at 1229; see also Nelson, supra note 54, at 109-
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sary before any definite conclusions can be reached as to the rea-
sons for the rise of the penitentiary and criminal incarceration, it
is clear that the accompanying decline of restitution in the crimi-
nal justice system had a negative effect upon the role of victims in
criminal proceedings. This decline signaled a rejection of crimi-
nal law as a vehicle for the victim to obtain redress from the of-
fender for damages, and the victim's remedy became instead
primarily the civil tort action.58 It is not surprising that victims
were relegated to the role of a witness in a criminal proceeding
once they were no longer perceived as having a direct restitutive
interest in the criminal proceeding.
III. REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM IN A CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING: A REFORM IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE
A. The Victim's Interests
The efforts which have been made in recent years to expand the
crime victim's role beyond that of an ordinary witness in the crim-
13. At the same time this was occurring, crime was climbing steadily and generat-
ing great public concern.
It is Hirsch's thesis that these changes caused a breakdown in the effectiveness
of its traditional criminal sanctions and weakened the original system of crime
control and that Massachusetts lawmakers turned to the penitentiary and criminal
incarceration in order to bring crime under control. One of the sanctions which
seems to have broken down was restitution which was linked to the sale into ser-
vitude. The seventeenth century practice of selling into service a thief who was
unable to pay the victim treble damages in order to work off the damage judgment
depended upon there being a willing buyer. As early as 1702, problems began to
be encountered in finding buyers for convicted thieves and, by the late 1700's, this
market had virtually collapsed. Hirsch hypothesizes that one of the reasons the
demand for the labor of convicted thieves fell off was because of a change in the
status of the offender and points out that "[ilt was one thing for a community
member to admit into his household a wayward individual whom he had known,
or known of, since birth; it was quite another to take charge of a transient pauper
whose sole connection to the town was born of misconduct." Id. at 1232.
58. Some of the treatises on criminal law published in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury illustrate that a distinction was made between criminal offenses and civil
(tort) wrongs, that restitution was rejected as a goal of the criminal law, and that
there was an acceptance of the principle that the crime victim should turn to civil
law in order to obtain redress from the offender. See F. HILLIARD, THE ELEMENTS
OF LAW: BEING A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF AMERICAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE 221-
26 (1835); T. WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW 32 (3rd ed. 1855).
Similarly, one of the leading modern treatises on criminal law emphasizes the
differing functions of criminal law and civil tort law. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
THE CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT] ("The
function of tort law is to compensate someone who is injured for the harm he has
suffered. With crimes, the state itself brings criminal proceedings to protect the
public interest but not to compensate the victim.") (emphasis added).
inal proceeding constitute something of a reform in search of a ra-
tionale. In order to determine whether expansion of the victim's
role is justified, it is necessary to examine at the outset whether
the criminal proceeding is likely to have a major impact upon the
legitimate and significant interests of the victim and whether the
public prosecutor is able and willing to represent those interests
adequately.
1. The Victim's Interest in Restitution
Crime victims arguably have an interest in restitution which
may be affected by the criminal proceedings. As noted previ-
ously, the use of restitution in the context of the criminal law has
clear historical precedent. 59 In the last several decades, there has
been a rediscovery of restitution within the criminal justice sys-
tem. Almost all states and the federal government have statutes
dealing with restitution. These statutes typically authorize resti-
tution at the sentencing of a convicted offender as a condition of
probation.60 States have also increasingly enacted legislation au-
thorizing restitution in connection with other kinds of
sentences. 6 1 In addition, several states have passed legislation
authorizing restitution as a condition of a pre-trial diversion
agreement and other preadjudicatory dispositions. 62 While many
of these statutes give the court the discretionary power to order
restitution, others require restitution63 or mandate its considera-
tion.64 Moreover, a variety of restitution programs have been es-
tablished for both adult and juvenile offenders in connection with
pre-trial diversion, probation, and parole.65
59. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
60. Harland, supra note 8, at 69-70 (compilation of relevant statutory
citations).
61. Id. at 70-77 (compilation of relevant statutory citations).
62. Id. at 68 (compilation of relevant statutory citations).
63. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-603(c) (1978) (court shall require resti-
tution as condition of probation after consideration of victim's loss and defend-
ant's economic circumstances); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(a) (West Supp. 1984)
(when defendant is convicted of a felony, court shall order the defendant to pay
restitution fine); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 342(f) (1) (1982) (restitution required in
addition to penalty for theft over $300); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-116 (1982) (resti-
tution required sentence for stealing, receiving, and defrauding).
64. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982) (court must state on the record the rea-
sons for not ordering restitution or for ordering only partial restitution).
65. The federal government through the Law Enforcement Assistance Admin-
istration (LEAA) has been a major source of support for the development and
evaluation of restitution programming for adult criminal offenders, and the federal
government, through the Federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention, has been a major source of support for the development and evaluation of
restitution programming for juvenile offenders. See RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF
PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD CRIMES, supra note 51, at 3. See also A. HARLAND, M.
WARREN & E. BROWN, A GUIDE TO RESTITUTION PROGRAMMING (1979); NATIONAL OF-
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The contemporary growth in the acceptance of restitution as a
sentencing alternative has led to a reexamination of the theoreti-
cal bases of restitution and its relation to the goals of the criminal
justice sanctioning process. It is significant that the modern revi-
val of restitution began during a period when the rehabilitative
ideal was in vogue and was originally seen as a means of promot-
ing rehabilitation. 66 Restitution is still sometimes seen as aiding
the rehabilitation of the offender by instilling a sense of responsi-
bility in the offender, enhancing the offender's self-esteem, and
leading to an increased reintegration of the offender into the com-
munity.67 Restitution is also sometimes seen as a component of,
or at least compatible with, other traditional goals of the criminal
sanctioning process, including specific and general deterrence,
and retribution.68
With the rise of the victim's rights movement, the focus of pro-
ponents of restitution has shifted. Restitution has increasingly
come to be regarded as an independent major function of a crimi-
FICE FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, MANAGING JUVENILE RESTITUTION PROJECTS
(1979); W. EDELHERTZ, RESTITUTIVE JUSTICE: A GENERAL SURVEY AND ANALYSIS
(1975). For an overview of restitution programming, see Edelhertz, Legal and Op-
erational Issues in the Implementation of Restitution Within the Criminal Justice
System in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977);
Galaway, Toward the Rational Development of Restitution, in RESTITUTION, id. at
77; Galaway, The Use of Restitution, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 57 (1977); Siegel, supra
note 51.
66. See, e.g., S. SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME
(1970); Mower, Loss and Recovery of Community, in INNOVATIONS TO GROUP PSY-
CHOTHERAPY 130 (G. Gazda ed. 1968); Schaefer, The Victim and Correctional The-
ory. Integrating Victim Reparation with Offender Rehabilitation, in ASSESSING THE
CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 227; Cohen, The Integration of Restitution in the Proba-
tion Services, 34 J. CRIM. & CRIMIMOLOGY 315 (1944); Eglash, Creative Restitution.
A Broader Meaningfor an Old Term, 48 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 619 (1958); Eglash,
Creative Restitution: Some -Suggestions for Prison Rehabilitation Programs, 40
AM. J. OF CORRECTIONS 20 (Nov.-Dec. 1958) [hereinafter cited as Eglash, Creative
Restitution]; Galaway & Hudson, Restitution and Rehabilitation: Some Central Is-
sues, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 403 (1972).
67. See, e.g., Eglash, Creative Restitution, supra note 66, at 40. See also Keve,
The Therapeutic Uses of Restitution, in OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND AC-
TION 59 (B. Galaway & Joe Hudson eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as OFFENDER
RESTITUTION].
68. See McDonald, Expanding the Victim's Role in the Disposition Decision:
Reform in Search of a Rationale in OFFENDER RESTITUTION, supra note 10, at 101.
For a critical analysis of the relationship between restitution and deterrence see
Tuttle, Restitution and Deterrence: An Evaluation of Compatibility, in OFFENDER
RESTITUTION, supra note 67, at 33. For a critical analysis of the relationship be-
tween restitution and retribution, see McAnany, Restitution as Idea and Practice:
The Retributive Process, in OFFENDER RESTITUTION, supra note 67, at 15.
nal prosecution, not just a means of promoting certain goals of the
criminal justice sanctioning process. A restitutive theory of crimi-
nal justice has even been developed to justify redress to victims
from a philosophical and ethical perspective. Under this theory, a
crime is viewed as a violation of the "rights" of the victim by the
offender which creates an imbalance between them, and the dom-
inant concern of a criminal action is viewed as the rectification of
this imbalance. 69 Proponents of the theory take the position that
victims should occupy a central, rather than peripheral role in the
criminal process, based upon the principle that the function of a
criminal action is to rectify the violation of the victim's rights by
the defendant.70
The restitutive theory of justice has been criticized on the
ground that the crime victim may seek restitution from the perpe-
trator of a crime in the civil courts through a tort action, whether
or not a criminal prosecution is initiated or a restitutive sentence
is imposed.71 Although such criticism may have some validity
from a conceptual standpoint, it overlooks the inadequacies of the
civil tort action in providing financial relief to the victim. 72 Vic-
tims may be unaware of the availability of a tort remedy; victims
69. The restitutive theory of criminal justice has been largely developed by
Randy Barnett. See Barnett & Hagel, Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribu-
tion, and the Legal Process, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 1; Bar-
nett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, in ASSESSING THE
CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 349; Barnett, The Justice of Restitution, 25 AM. J. JURIS.
117 (1980); Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS
279 (1977). For a critique of certain aspects of Barnett's theory see Epstein, Crime
and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at
231 [hereinafter cited as Epstein]; Miller, Restitution and Punishment: A Reply to
Barnett, 88 ETHICS 358 (1978); Pilon, Criminal Remedies. Restitution, Punishment
or Both?, 88 ETHICS 348 (1978).
70. See Barnett & Hagel, supra note 69, at 25-26. Barnett and Hagel state that
under a restitutive theory of criminal justice, the parties to a criminal action would
be the victim and the defendant, with the state's role restricted to mediating the
dispute and enforcing the judgment. Id.
71. During the early nineteenth century there was a marked decline in the
availability and use of restitution to victims of crimes in the criminal justice sys-
tem. A civil tort action was regarded as the proper remedy for the victim of crime
seeking redress against the criminal offender. See supra note 58 and accompany-
ing text. There is a long-standing debate among philosophers and legal scholars as
to the validity of traditional distinctions between the criminal law and the tort law.
Compare 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 44 (1881) [hereinafter cited as O.W.
HOLMES] ("the general principles of criminal and civil liability are the same")
with Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1943)
(critique of Holmes' analysis). The rediscovery of restitution in the last several
decades has injected new life into this debate. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 69, at
231.
72. See R. MEINERS, VICTIM COMPENSATION 3-4 (1978) (public payments neces-
sary because of inadequacies of civil proceedings). A 1967 study of 167 victims of
personal violence in Toronto found that only 14.9 percent considered suing, 5.4 per-
cent consulted an attorney, 4.8 actually sued, and only 1.8 percent recovered dam-
ages. Linden, Victims of Crime and Tort Law, 12 CAN. B.J. 17, 21-22 (1969).
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may lack the resources to institute an action and be unable to ob-
tain the assistance of counsel on a contingent fee basis; victims
may be unwilling to undergo the inconvenience of bringing suit,
especially if the damages are relatively small and the offender is
insolvent; and victims, who have already been through a criminal
proceeding, may not have the energy and stamina required to be-
come involved in yet another proceeding.
Whatever the significance and wisdom of the traditional distinc-
tion between the punishment of criminal offenders through the
criminal law and the compensation of crime victims through civil
tort law, as a practical matter, the wide acceptance and use of res-
titution within the criminal justice system has already resulted in
the partial merger of criminal and tort law. As a consequence, the
victim can be viewed as having a direct interest of a restitutive
nature in the criminal proceeding. This restitutive interest, of
course, may be more illusory than real if restitution is not a viable
sentencing alternative because of the offender's lack of financial
resources or earning power. While it has been commonly as-
sumed that many offenders cannot provide adequate compensa-
tion to their victims, one extensive study has concluded that
"relatively few victimizations are so costly as to negate the possi-
bility of restitutive disposition even bearing in mind the very low
income levels of defendants. ' 73 Nevertheless, restitution may be
more feasible or desirable for certain types of offenses than for
other types of offenses. 74 In short, the victim's restitutive interest
in a criminal proceeding will vary from case to case, depending on
73. RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD CRIMES, supra note
51, at vii.
74. For example, Professor Goldstein has argued that restitution is especially
appropriate for the so-called white-collar crimes which he defines as "crime com-
mitted in an organizational setting, generally involving fraud or abuse of trust by
persons or corporations of means." Goldstein, supra note 19, at 532. According to
Professor Goldstein, restitution is especially appropriate for such crime for the fol-
lowing reasons:
First, these offenders-individual or corporate-are affluent and their vic-
tims are likely to be of modest means, confounding the usual stereotypes
about victims an [sic) offenders. . . . Second, these crimes are usually
committed by persons who calculate rationally to gain economic advan-
tage and are more susceptible to stigma and to sanctions that impose eco-
nomic costs .... Third, the prospect of financial compensation provides
an obvious incentive to victims to bring the crimes committed against
them to the attention of the authorities and to participate in their
prosecution.
Id. at 533.
factors such as the nature of the offense, damage sustained by the
victim, and the offender's financial resources.
2. The Victim's Interest in Retribution
Crime victims may also arguably have an interest in retribution
which may be affected by criminal proceedings. Even though ret-
ribution is one of the traditionally recognized goals of the criminal
sanctioning process and has been characterized as the oldest the-
ory of punishment, 75 there is no consensus as to its definition or
the concepts it embodies. One of the standard works on criminal
law states that retribution is the imposition of "punishment (the
infliction of suffering) . . .by society ... because it is only fitting
and just that one who has caused harm to others should himself
suffer for it. '"76 Retribution, as a goal of the criminal sanctioning
process, is often said to have its roots in individual vengeance
against the offender by the victim. 77
There are a host of philosophical, ethical, as well as definitional
and conceptual problems with the principle that retribution
should be one of the aims of criminal punishment. Although the
retributive theory of punishment has prominent defenders, 78 it
was until recently the least accepted theory of punishment among
twentieth century American philosophers and scholars.7 9 There
is a considerable body of literature assessing retribution from a
philosophical and ethical perspective which does not lend itself to
being briefly or easily summarized, but critics of retribution gen-
erally assert that punishment imposed without reference to a util-
itarian calculus which weighs its benefits in terms of preventing
future crimes against its costs is morally indefensible. 80 In the
75. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 58, at 24.
76. Id. For an analysis of varying formulations of the retributive theory of
criminal punishment, see N. WALKER, THE AIMS OF THE PENAL SYSTEM (1966)
[hereinafter cited as N. WALKER]; Gerber & McAnany, Retribution in CONTEMPO-
RARY PUNISHMENT, 39-40 (R. Gerber & P. McAnany eds. 1972); McAnany, supra note
68, at 15. While formulations of the retributive theory vary, they generally empha-
size that the offender is responsible and deserves punishment, that the punish-
ment should be proportional to the offense, and that the focus of punishment is
the past offense not the prevention of future offenses. Id.
77. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 71, at 2-3, 40-41; 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW IN ENGLAND 80 (1863) ("The criminal law stands to the passion of
revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite."). But see
B. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 10-14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as B. VAN
DEN HAAG] (revenge is confused with retribution and is not a justification for
criminal punishment).
78. See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, supra note 71, at 40-41.
79. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 58, at 24; McAnany, supra note 68, at 15.
See, e.g., N. WALKER, supra note 76; Kaufmann, Retribution and the Ethics of Pun-
ishment in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 211.
80. Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 630,
636 (1938).
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last several years, however, as other theories of punishment have
fallen into disrepute, there has been a revival of interest in retri-
bution among theorists.81
Among a considerable segment of the public and among crime
victims, their families, friends, and associates, there appears to be
substantial support for the retributive punishment of criminal of-
fenders. Criminal offenses do in fact often produce a perceived
need and desire for retaliation against the offender. 82 To some ex-
tent, societal attitudes toward such needs and desires depend
upon how they are characterized. The term "vengeance" has a
negative connotation, whereas the term "justice" has a positive
connotation. The victim who seeks vengeance may evoke disap-
proval, but the victim who seeks justice may evoke sympathy.83
Given the existence of a general need and desire for retaliatory
punishment of the criminal offender, it has been asserted that
punishment for retributive purposes is necessary "to maintain re-
spect for the law and to suppress acts of private vengeance." 84
Private vengeance outside of the criminal law and the criminal
courts designed to "get even" with the offender may be attempted
if there is little confidence that the criminal justice system is able
or willing to impose retributive punishment. Since individuals ob-
viously are reluctant to implicate themselves by reporting their
acts of private vengeance, it is difficult to assess their frequency,
and there is almost no research dealing with individual acts of
private vengeance.85 Group vengeance or vigilantism is more eas-
81. See, e.g., McAnany, supra note 68, at 15. See, e.g., ARMSTRONG, THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF PUNISHMENT (1969); Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in
ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 181.
82. See Toby, Is Punishment Necessary?, 55 J. CRIM. L., CRnINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 332, 333 (1964). See also N. GAGE, ELENI (1973) (factual account of a son's at-
tempt to find and punish the individuals responsible for his mother's death). Com-
pare F. ALEXANDER & A. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC (rev.
ed. 1956) (a psychoanalytic explanation of retribution) with Halleck, Vengeance
and Victimization, 5 VICTIMOLOGY 99 (1980) (advocating rejection of retribution by
victims and their families, on the ground that it is not conducive to mental health
and produces further victimization and violence).
83. For an insightful inquiry into the relation between vengeance and justice,
see J. JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE (1954).
84. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 58; see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
183-84, n.30 (1976); A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 92-93 (1953); E.
VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 77, at 13; McAnany, supra note 68, at 20; Gahringer,
Punishment and Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 291, 291-93 (1969).
85. See Ziegenhagen, Toward a Theory of Victim-Criminal Justice System In-
teractions, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM, supra note 1, at 261, 268-69. Frag-
mentary data suggests that personal vengeance exists in a substantial number of
ily documented and has been a recurrent phenomenon in Ameri-
can society.86
Finally, from the standpoint of the law-abiding crime victim, the
state can be seen as displacing the victim's right to exact private
vengeance and requiring the victim to channel any desires for re-
taliation against the offender through the criminal justice sys-
tem. 87 Thus, the criminal law can be regarded as establishing a
social contract between the state and the victim-the victim gives
up the right to private vengeance and the state undertakes to vin-
dicate the wrong done to the victim by imposing a criminal sanc-
tion upon the offender. Accordingly, it would seem to follow that
the victim should be deemed to have a retributive interest in the
outcome of the prosecution.
3. Other Interests of the Victim
In addition to the interests of crime victims in restitution and
retribution, there are several other identifiable interests which
may be affected by criminal proceedings. The victim clearly has
an interest in protecting his or her reputation, preventing his or
her privacy from being unduly invaded, and in avoiding harass-
ment and intimidation by the defendant. In some cases, the de-
fense may allege that the victim precipitated or provoked the
crime, thereby calling into question the victim's character and ve-
racity.8 8 While the defense's questioning of the victim/witness is
subject to some constraints, the victim, unlike the defendant, has
no general right to refuse to testify, and he or she cannot be en-
tirely insulated from defense attacks, given the adversarial nature
homicides which come to the attention of law enforcement authorities. Id. at 268-
69. See, e.g., Wolfgang, Victim Precipitated Criminal Homicide, 48 J. CRIM. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 1-11 (1957) (in 62 percent of the homicide cases sampled, the victim had a
history of victimizing others).
86. For a general history of vigilantism, see Brown, Violence in America: His-
torical and Comparative Perspectives (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969); Brown, Le-
gal and Behavioral Perspectives on American Vigilantism, in PERSPECTIVES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 95 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971). See also E. VAN DEN
HAAG, supra note 77, at 13-14.
87. See N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 56 (1974).
88. See Ash, supra note 1, at 398, 402-04. See also ABA VICTIM/WITNESS LEGIS-
LATION, supra note 12, at 43. The invasion of a victim-witness's privacy, and at-
tacks on his or her reputation, are a particular problem in cases of involuntary
rape and other forms of sexual assault because of special evidentiary rules appli-
cable in these cases. In rape cases, the defense has traditionally had wide latitude
in inquiry into the victim's prior sexual conduct with other individuals and the vic-
tim's general reputation as to chastity for purposes of showing consent on the part
of the victim. See generally Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases
in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Kneedler, supra note 4, at 486-97 (re-
view of Virginia law prior to legislative reform in 1981). Even, however, in cases
not involving rape or sexual assault, character evidence may be used to discredit a
victim-witness. See 3A J. WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE §§ 920-930 (1970 & Supp. 1979).
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of criminal litigation and the defendant's constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine an adverse witness.8 9
A related, but nonetheless distinct, interest is that of the victim
in minimizing the psychological trauma of the victimization and
contact with the criminal justice system. Mental health profes-
sionals report that a sense of powerlessness is a frequent compo-
nent of the psychological trauma suffered by many victims of
crime, particularly violent crime. 90 Since victims have almost no
real input into or control of the criminal court process, this sense
of powerlessness may be intensified and exacerbated by contact
with the criminal justice system.9 1 Although there has been little
scientific investigation on this subject, one hypothesis is that al-
lowing the victim to participate more fully in key decisions in the
criminal litigation might serve to reduce the victim's sense of
powerlessness and thereby reduce the victim's psychological
trauma.
4. Representation of the Victim's Interests by the Public
Prosecutor
Even if the crime victims are considered to have interests of a
significant and legitimate nature in the criminal proceeding, there
is no need to expand the role of victims in the proceeding pro-
vided the prosecutor can and does represent those interests ade-
89. During the last decade, United States Supreme Court decisions dealing
with the scope of a defendant's federal constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine the State's witnesses has indicated that this right is broad, albeit not un-
limited. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (criminal defendant's right is
paramount to state interest in protecting juvenile offenders and witnesses' interest
in being spared the embarrassment and disclosure of his juvenile court record).
See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). Cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368 (1979).
A number of states have adopted rape shield laws limiting the admissibility of
evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with persons other than the defend-
ant in order to protect victims from harassment and humiliation. These laws, how-
ever, generally expressly permit or have been interpreted to permit the admission
of such evidence under certain circumstances, and some of these laws have been
constitutionally challenged on the ground that they violate the defendant's right to
a fair trial in accordance with due process. For an analysis of the provisions of
these laws, their interpretion, and their constitutionality, see Brienen, supra note
4, at 197-206.
90. See Krupnick, Brief Psychotherapy with Victims of Violent Crime, 5 Vic-
TIMOLOGY 347, 349 (1980).
91. See D. Kelly, Major Issues of Victim Concern 5 (paper submitted to ABA
Section of Criminal Justice).
quately. Certainly, the prosecutor's decisions-with respect to
the initiation of prosecution, the offense or offenses to charge, the
negotiation and acceptance of guilty pleas, and sentence recom-
mendations--can greatly influence the interests of victims, partic-
ularly the restitutive and retributive interests. 92 Victims in their
current circumscribed role as witnesses, however, do not formally
participate in such decision-making. They can make their wishes
regarding these decisions known to the prosecutor, but the prose-
cutor is not obligated to comply with their wishes.
While prosecutors have been in the forefront of the victims'
rights movement, and many are sensitive to victim interests, it is
the prosecutor's duty and responsibility to represent the interests
of the state.93 If a conflict, actual or perceived, arises between the
state's and the victim's interests, the prosecutor must give prior-
ity to interests of the state. It must also be recognized that crimi-
nal courts are social organizations and that prosecutors perform
their duties within that organizational context. Prosecutors work,
over a period of time, with police officers, defense attorneys, and
judges, and develop continuing relationships with such individu-
als. In contrast, the prosecutor's contact with any one victim is
relatively brief and limited. Consequently, prosecutors have
closer ties to the former group than to the latter group.94 More-
over, prosecutors tend to respond to organizational goals. One of
the primary goals of the criminal courts, albeit often an unofficial
92. The possible negative consequences of prosecutorial decisions on the vic-
tim's restitutive interest have been described as follows:
If the prosecutor is insensitive to the victim's interests, the restitution is-
sue may be neglected entirely or the issue of damages may be presented
poorly to the probation officer or the court at the restitution hearing; or
the prosecutor may be inattentive to the implications for restitution of ob-
taining a conviction on one charge alone or on a minor charge. And it may
not occur to him to use the negotiations on a guilty plea as an occasion at
which other offenses-charged or uncharged-might be admitted by the
defendant in order to broaden the basis for restitution.
Goldstein, supra note 19, at 548.
93. The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the Prosecution
Function state that the prosecutor's multiple function is "to convict the guilty," "to
enforce the rights of the public," and "to guard the rights of the accused." ABA,
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROS-
ECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Prosecution Function Standard 1.1
and commentary, at 43-46 (1971) (approved by ABA House of Delegates Feb. 8,
1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS]. The ABA Standards
do not expressly recognize any duty or responsibility on the part of the prosecutor
with respect to the victim's interests. See also D. NISSMAN & E. HAGEN, THE PROS-
ECUTION FUNCTION 1-2, 7-11 (1982).
94. See D. Kelly, Victims' Reactions to the Criminal Justice Response 3 (June
1982) [hereinafter cited as D. Kelly] (paper prepared for delivery at the 1982 meet-
ing of the Law and Society Association); J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, AN ORGANIZA-
TIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183
(1967) [hereinafter cited as A. BLUMBERG].
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one, is to use limited resources efficiently by disposing of large
numbers of cases as quickly as possible, and, in pursuing this
goal, the victim's interests may be sacrificed.9 5 According to one
well-known authority, prosecutors and other criminal justice offi-
cials may manipulate victims and respond to their needs only
when it promotes their organizational as well as personal goals.96
B. The Systemic and Societal Interest in Reducing Victim
Alienation from the Criminal Justice System
It can also be argued that there are systemic and societal inter-
ests which dictate giving the crime victim a greater role in the
criminal proceeding. More specifically, it can be argued that the
victim's role should be enlarged in order to increase his or her co-
operation in the reporting of crimes and the prosecution of crimi-
nal offenders. This justification for enlargement of the crime
victim's role rests on a series of empirical assumptions. These as-
sumptions are as follows: first, that there is substantial victim
alienation from the criminal justice system; second, that affording
95. As the National District Attorney's Association has pointed out,
"[P [rosecutors are typically pressed by time, heavy caseloads, and crises to reflect
long on the situation of the crime victim." (quoted in D. Kelly, supra note 94, at 3).
See A. BLUMBERG, supra note 94, at 132, 182-83, 197; see also Feeley, Two Models of
the Criminal Justice System: An Organizational Perspective, 7 L. & Soc. REV. 407
(1973). There is a large body of sociological literature on how organizations estab-
lish and implement goals. See generally P. BLAU & W.R. Scowrr, FORMAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1962); Thompson & McEwen, Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal-
Setting as an Interaction Process, 23 Am. Soc. REV. 23 (1958).
96. See McDonald, supra note 10, at 302-06. For example, McDonald reports
that a tactic called "cooling the victim out" is widely used by prosecutors, as well
as defense attorneys and judges, to manipulate the victim. Since victims "are
most vengeful, upset, and therefore, likely to be a 'problem' immediately after the
crime," the prosecutor will sometimes have the case "continued several months
until the victim 'cools off' and can be reasonable." Id. at 303. Another example of
prosecutorial tactics described by McDonald is as follows:
Take ... the prosecutor who has a case that he would like to dismiss, but
the victim is present in the courtroom and could be "a problem." The
clever prosecutor waits for the victim to leave the courtroom for a few
minutes' break and then quickly has the case called and dismisses it.
When the victim returns, the prosecutor profusely apologizes to him, ex-
plaining that he should never have left the room. When he did, the case
was called and had to be dismissed because he was not present. Some-
times it is the "system" in general that is to blame. For example, when
the prosecutor has agreed to a plea bargain that specifies that the prosecu-
tor will keep the victim away from the sentencing hearing, the resourceful
prosecutor will notify the victim to come at 1:00 P.M. although the hearing
is scheduled for 11:00 A.M. When the victim arrives he will be told that
"the system" is to blame for "a last minute change in the schedule."
Id. at 304.
victims more opportunity to have input into or even control of
criminal proceedings would lead to greater victim satisfaction
with the criminal justice system; third, that greater victim satis-
faction with the system would translate into greater cooperation
of victims in the reporting of crimes; and, fourth, that greater vic-
tim satisfaction with the system would translate into increased
cooperation of victims in the prosecution of criminal offenders.
Turning to the initial issue of whether there is substantial vic-
tim alienation from the criminal justice system, the very exist-
ence of a large and active "victim's rights movement" would seem
to be a manifestation of widespread victim alienation, though ad-
mittedly the victim's rights movement covers a multiplicity of or-
ganizations, groups, and individuals with a variety of experiences
and attitudes. 97 There are also a number of written and oral ac-
counts by victims of their negative experiences with the criminal
justice system which have in turn produced negative attitudes on
their part towards the system. 98 Despite the current interest in
victims, however, there has been relatively little rigorous system-
atic empirical research dealing with victim alienation from the
criminal justice system, and the research that has been done
leaves many questions unanswered as to the extent and nature of
such alienation.99
Assuming that substantial victim alienation from the criminal
justice system does in fact exist, the next issue is whether greater
victim participation and involvement in the criminal proceedings
would reduce victim alienation by increasing victim satisfaction
with the criminal justice system. Here again, there is a paucity of
empirical research, and the research that has been done is some-
what inconclusive.10 0
97. See supra notes 2-27 and accompanying text.
98. See generally PRESiEDNT's TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1.
99. One oft-cited survey of a sample of crime victims in Milwaukee who had
interactions with the criminal justice system concluded that "Victims and wit-
nesses are apparently far more satisfied with the performance of criminal justice
officials than reformers have believed." KNUDTEN, VICTIM PROBLEMS AND PERCEP-
TIONS, supra note 1, at 143. Another more recent survey of a sample of crime vic-
tims involved in the criminal justice system in Toronto found that such
involvement produced a negative assessment of the sentence imposed. Hagen,
Victims Before the Law: A Study of Victim Involvement in the Criminal Justice
Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 327, 329 (1982). Still another recent sur-
vey of a small sample of rape victims in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area
who had contacts with the prosecutors and courts found that a significant propor-
tion of these victims reported more dissatisfaction with prosecutorial services and
treatment subsequent to such contact than before such contact. D. Kelly, supra
note 94, at 13, 18-20.
100. A few evaluations of programs designed to increase victim participation in
criminal proceedings have been conducted. The most comprehensive of these
evaluations is that of an experimental program in Dade County, Florida in which
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Even if increased victim participation and involvement in the
criminal proceeding would significantly reduce victim alienation
from the criminal justice system, there remains the issue of
whether such satisfaction would translate into a higher rate of
crime reporting by victims. Crime victims are the major initiators
of the criminal justice process through the reporting of crimes.
Some studies have shown that over eighty percent of crimes are
known to the police only because of reports by citizens-the ma-
jority of whom are victims.01 Nevertheless, surveys of crime vic-
timization have consistently indicated that the total amount of
crime is greater than that which is reported,10 2 and such non-re-
porting of criminal victimization has had a detrimental impact
victims participated in pre-trial settlement conferences as a part of the plea nego-
tiation process. According to the report of the evaluation of the Dade County pro-
gram, many victims did not attend the conferences, and such non-attendance was
difficult to interpret because many of the non-attending victims claimed they had
not been notified. The evaluation found that the victims who did attend the con-
ferences were generally satisfied with the processing of their cases and that at-
tending victims were on the whole more satisfied than non-attending victims, but
the attendance-related effects were statistically insignificant. The evaluation also
found that attendance at the conferences by victims did not seem to affect their
attitudes toward the criminal justice system. W. KERSTETrER & A. HEINZ, PRETRIAL
SET LEMENT CONFERENCE: AN EVALUATION 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 124 (1979) [herein-
after cited as W. KERSTETrER & A. HEINZ].
101. A. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 64, 69, 84 (1971); R. SPARKS, RE-
SEARCH ON VICTIMS OF CRIME: ACCOMPLISHMENTS: ISSUES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 10
(1982) [hereinafter cited as R. SPARKS]; Black & Reiss, Patterns of Behavior in Po-
lice and Citizen Transactions, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, STUDIES IN CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MA-
JOR METROPOLITAN AREAS, 2 FIELD SURVEYS III (1967); Hindelang & Gottfredson,
The Victim's Decision Not To Invoke the Criminal Justice Process, in CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE AND THE VICTIM, supra note 1, at 57-58.
102. The primary source of data about crime reporting by victims is the Na-
tional Crime Panel (NCP) surveys which are conducted by the United States Bu-
reau of the Census in connection with the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the
United States Department of Justice. For a description of the history of the NCP
surveys and the methodology of these surveys, see generally R. SPARKS, supra
note 101, at 41-93. According to the published findings of the 1979 NCP household
survey, only thirty percent of all personal crimes were reported to the police and
only thirty-six percent of all household crimes were reported to the police, with
some variation in the rates of reporting of specific crimes within these two catego-
ries. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1979, 15-16 (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter cited as 1979 NCP
SURVEY]. The findings of NCP surveys in prior years with respect to reporting
rates are the same or similar to those of the 1979 NCP survey. See, e.g., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1978, 12 (Dec. 1980); NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS
SERVICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1977).
upon the ability of the criminal justice system to effectively per-
form its crime prevention and control functions.103 The relation-
ship, however, between victim failure to report crimes, victim
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system, and victim partic-
ipation in criminal proceedings is uncertain. Available survey
data indicates that decisions by victims not to report incidents of
victimization are most strongly related to the character of the vic-
timization,l0 4 but the surveys which have produced this data have
not directly addressed whether and how much victim crime re-
porting behavior is influenced by their attitudes toward the crimi-
nal justice system. 0 5
There is also the issue of whether increased victim satisfaction
with the criminal justice system, as a result of increased victim
participation and involvement in criminal proceedings, would pro-
duce more and better cooperation of victims in the prosecution of
alleged offenders. Non-cooperation of victims and other witnesses
in the prosecution of alleged offenders is a major problem leading
to the eventual dismissal of many cases.1 0 6 Existing studies sug-
gest that the problem of victim non-cooperation is attributable to
factors such as the cost and inconvenience of cooperation and the
lack of communication between prosecutors and witnesses. 0 7
103. If crimes are not reported, offenders, who constitute a serious and continu-
ing threat to the safety of the community, cannot be identified and dealt with by
the criminal justice system in a manner which will protect the community. More-
over, if crimes are not reported, the general deterrent effect of the criminal law
may be undercut because a potential offender who knows or believes that the
commission of a crime will not be reported need not fear apprehension and even-
tual punishment for the crime.
104. For example, the NCP surveys ask victims about their reasons for not in-
forming the police of the crime, and the most frequent responses are that the inci-
dent was "not serious enough" to report or that "nothing could be done" due to a
lack of proof about the offender's identity. 1979 NCP SURVEY, supra note 102, at 17.
105. Id.; see R. SPARKS, supra note 101, at 99.
106. A 1972 report prepared for the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Goals and Standards concluded that the failure of witnesses to "show up"
at court hearings was "throughout the country, the most prevalent reason for dis-
missal of cases for want of prosecution and a significant contributor to overall dis-
missal rates." J. LACY, NATIONAL STANDARDS CONCERNING THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS 27 (1972) (quoted in VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE MEDIATION AND ARBITRA-
TION IN FELONY ARREST CASES 90 (undated)) [hereinafter cited as VERA]. Sev-
eral empirical studies have provided statistical documentation of this problem. For
example, a study of felony cases in Washington, D.C. revealed that almost half of
the felony cases in the sample were rejected for prosecution at initial screening
because the witnesses were uncooperative. K. WILLAMS, THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM
IN THE PROSECUTION OF VIOLENT CRIME 28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as K.
WILLIAMS].
107. The most frequently cited reasons in the literature for witness non-cooper-
ation are time delay, loss of income due to court attendance, inappropriate physi-
cal accomodations, and witness intimidation. See F. CANNAVALE & W. FALCON,
WITNESS COOPERATION 13-14 (1976). Some studies of this problem, however, have
indicated that witnesses who have some type of preexisting relationship with the
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The available data, however, is not really sufficient to reach any
definite conclusion about the causal links, if any, between victim
non-cooperation in the prosecution of alleged offenders, victim
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system, and victim partic-
ipation in criminal proceedings.
In summary, crime victims have several interests of relevance
in determining the appropriate role of the victim in a criminal
proceeding. One such important interest is restitution and an-
other is retribution. Victims also have an interest in protecting
their reputations and privacy, preventing intimidation and harass-
ment by the defense, and minimizing the psychological trauma of
the victimization and subsequent contact with the criminal justice
system. The conduct and outcome of proceedings in the criminal
courts obviously may have an impact upon these interests since
the public prosecutor cannot be depended upon to always ade-
quately represent these interests of victims inasmuch as they
may conflict with the state's interests as interpreted by the prose-
cutor. Therefore, a strong case can be made that the victim
should be afforded more input into, and even control of, the crimi-
nal proceedings.
There are also systemic and societal interests in increasing vic-
tim cooperation in the reporting of crime and the prosecution of
criminal offenders which may lend some additional support to giv-
ing victims a more significant role in criminal proceedings. It is
unclear, however, whether such restructuring of the victim's role
would have the desired effect of increasing victim cooperation in
the reporting of crimes and the prosecution of alleged offenders
by reducing victim alienation from the criminal justice system.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM AT SPECIFIC STAGES OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
As it has been pointed out, crime victims have interests in con-
nection with the prosecution of alleged criminal offenders that
provide a persuasive rationale for giving victims a greater role in
accused are less likely to cooperate with the prosecutor than witnesses who are
strangers to the accused. See, e.g., Williams, The Effects of Victim Characteristics
on the Disposition of Violent Crime, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM, supra
note 1, at 204. Still another study, probably the most extensive thus far conducted,
identified the chief cause of non-cooperation to be poor communication between
prosecutors and witnesses resulting in the mislabeling of witnesses as uncoopera-
tive. F. CANNAVALE & W. FALCON, supra, at 75-100.
criminal proceedings. Before, however, the role of the victim is
enlarged, the benefits of this role redefinition should be weighed
against its costs, taking into account not only the interests of the
victim but also the interests of the state and the defendant. It
must be emphasized that the appropriate role for the victim to
play may be different at different stages of the criminal
proceeding.
A. Initiation of Criminal Action
1. Private Prosecution
While vestiges of the colonial system of private prosecution still
exist,108 the initiation of a criminal action rests largely with the
public prosecutor.109 It is difficult to determine precisely the ex-
tent to which victims can currently initiate a criminal action with-
out the authorization or approval of the public prosecutor. First
of all, there is no agreement as to what constitutes the com-
mencement of a criminal proceeding-there is a tremendous vari-
ation in the methods utilized to commence criminal proceedings
from state to state and within states from court to court.' 10 Fur-
thermore, even if a victim or other citizen has the right to bring a
criminal action without the authorization or approval of the public
prosecutor, once a proceeding is commenced, the public prosecu-
108. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
109. Public prosecutors are typically given a broad grant of statutory authority
to initiate criminal actions. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-532(1) (2) & (4)
(1983); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26500, 26501 (West 1968 & West Supp. 1983); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 502 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 56.060 (Vernon 1984).
110. The differences in the views as to what constitutes the commencement of a
criminal action and the differences in the methods utilized to commence criminal
actions have been summarized as follows:
In practically all jurisdictions statutes or rules provide a method whereby
a private citizen may make a criminal accusation against one alleged to
have violated the law by making oath, affidavit, complaint, or the like,
before a judicial officer who, on finding probable cause to be present, may
issue a warrant or process thereon. Under many provisions of this nature
it is evident that the approval or authorization of the prosecuting attorney
is not contemplated at the time the initial criminal accusation is made.
Under various methods of procedure, a criminal prosecution may be
deemed to have been commenced with the issuance of a warrant, with the
arrest of the person charged with crime, or, perhaps most commonly,
when a formal written complaint or affidavit charging the commission of a
public offense is filed with a judicial officer. Furthermore, in some juris-
dictions a grand jury may, under appropriate circumstances, make a pre-
sentment or informal accusation or return an indictment, without any bill
of indictment having been submitted by the prosecuting attorney, which
may be deemed to be the commencement of a criminal prosecution.
The desirability of a uniform stance with respect to control over the in-
stitution of criminal proceedings has been recognized by the legal
profession.
Annot. 66 A.L.R. 3d 732, 734-35 (1975) (citations omitted).
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tor may have the power to dismiss or enter a nolle prosequi. 111
Apparently, there are only a few states where a victim has a clear
right to bring a criminal action, and the exercise of this right is
generally restricted to cases involving minor offenses."l 2
It is possible to envision a criminal justice system under which
private prosecutions would be revived and the victim would be
able to initiate a criminal action without the authorization or ap-
proval of the public prosecutor. Victim-initiated private prosecu-
tions, however, would run counter to the well-established
enormous discretionary power of the public prosecutor with re-
spect to charging decisions-whether to file formal criminal
charges, what offense or offenses to charge, and whether to dis-
miss the criminal action once brought.113 The discretionary
111. In some jurisdictions public prosecutors may dismiss or enter a nolle
prosequi once a criminal prosecution is commenced in order to terminate the
prosecution without the consent of the court, but in many jurisdictions the con-
sent of the court is required. See C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 419-
22, 221 (12th ed. 1975 & Supp. 1983) and authorities therein cited; see also Annot. 66
A.L.R. 3d 732, 734 (1974). For a discussion of the public prosecutor's dismissal and
nolle prosequi power see Miller, supra note 69, at 308-17. Under English common
law, the Attorney General, who represented the Crown, had the unreviewable
power in criminal cases when prosecution had been initiated by private persons to
enter a nolle prosequi before judgment and thereby could exercise a measure of
control over such private prosecution, and American public prosecutors came to
exercise this power of the English Attorney General even though there was not
the same need for this power in the absence of private prosecution. See C. TORCIA,
supra, at 419; Goldstein, supra note 19, at 549.
112. In a few states private prosecution has been expressly permitted. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Luceno v. Couzzo, 97 Misc. 2d 871, 412 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1978) (private
parties have power to prosecute, but court has discretion in allowing case to con-
tinue); Voytko v. Ramada Inn of Atlantic City, 445 F. Supp. 315 (D. N.J. 1978) (vio-
lation of defrauding of innkeepers statute); People v. Van Sickle, 13 N.Y. 2d 61, 242
N.Y.S.2d 34 (1963); Bartell v. State, 106 Wis. 342, 82 N.W. 142 (1900) (assault and
battery). In some states, private prosecution has been explicitly barred. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W. 2d 361 (Minn. 1977); People v. Municipal Court,
27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1972). See Annot. 66 A.L.R. 3d 732 (1974).
See generally Comment, supra note 28; Comment, Private Prosecution-The En-
trenched Anomaly, 50 N.C.L. REV. 1171 (1972). Comment, Private Prosecution: A
Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Private Prosecution].
113. While discretion is an elusive concept, Kenneth Culp Davis in one of his
many works on this subject has stated that a public official has discretion "when-
ever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possi-
ble courses of action or inaction. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as K. DAVIS]. There is considera-
ble literature dealing with the prosecutorial charging discretion. This literature in-
cludes empirical studies of the prosecutorial charging process. See, e.g., R. FRASE,
THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE FEDERAL CRIMINAL CHARGES: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY
OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (1978); P. GREENWOOD, S. WILDHORN, E. POGGIO, M.
charging power of the prosecutor is characterized by a lack of
formal legal constraints.114 Victims who wish to challenge prose-
cutorial failure to commence criminal proceedings have no effec-
tive legal remedy.115
a. The Private Prosecution and the Victim's Interests
From the perspective of the crime victim's interests, the impact
of allowing victim-initiated private prosecutions would be benefi-
cial. If victims were allowed to initiate a criminal action, victims
could forestall or override negative prosecutorial charging deci-
sions that would adversely affect their restitutive and retributive
interests. A victim may be precluded from obtaining restitution
or retribution by the public prosecutor's discretionary decision
STRUMWASSER, & P. DELEON, PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS IN Los
ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (1973) [hereinafter cited as P. GREEN-
WOOD]; F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME (1969) [hereinafter cited as F. MILLER]; VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY
ARRESTS (1977) [hereinafter cited as FELONY ARRESTS]. Hall, The Role of the Vic-
tim in the Prosecution and Disposition of a Criminal Case, 28 VAND. L. REV. 931
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hall]; Neuberger, After the Arrest: The Charging Deci-
sion in Prairie City, 8 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 495 (1974); Rabin, Agency Criminal Refer-
rals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1036 (1972). This literature also includes a number of commentaries
on prosecutorial charging discretion. See, e.g., Gifford, Equal Protection and the
Prosecutors' Charging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659
(1981); Davis, supra at 188-96; Jacoby, The Charging Policies of Prosecutors in THE
PROSECUTOR 75 (W. McDonald ed. 1979); LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the
United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-
A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1965); Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Charging Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981).
114. See generally F. MILLER, supra note 113, at 297-337; Vorenberg, supra note
113, at 1537-43.
115. Private citizens, including victims, have sometimes sought with little suc-
cess to obtain judicial review of a negative prosecutorial charging decision in order
to compel a reluctant prosecutor to proceed through an action for a writ of manda-
mus. See, e.g., Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944); Ackerman v. Houston,
45 Ariz. 293, 43 P.2d 194 (1935). For a discussion of the use of the writ of manda-
mus to control negative prosecutorial charging discretion, see Note, The Use of
Mandamus to Control Prosecutorial Discretion, 13 AM. COMM. L. REV. 563 (1976), F.
MILLER, supra note 113, at 331-37. See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 335 F. Supp.
804 (N.D. Tex. 1971), affd, 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (request for injunction forbidding
public prosecutor from declining to prosecute denied). It should be noticed that in
some jurisdictions trial courts have the power to appoint a private attorney as a
substitute prosecutor, but attempts to obtain the appointment of a private prose-
cutor are usually not successful. For a survey of constitutional provisions, stat-
utes, and case law relating to the judicial appointment of a substitute prosecutor,
see Private Prosecution, supra note 112, at 214-18. See also F. MILLER, supra note
113, at 318-21. It should also be noted that there are legal remedies including crim-
inal prosecutions for nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance in office, ouster
suits and quo warranto actions, which may ultimately lead to the removal from
office of a prosecutor who declines to prosecute. These remedies, however, are
rarely invoked and even more rarely invoked successfully. See F. MILLER, supra
note 113, at 298-306 and authorities cited therein.
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not to bring a criminal action or to dismiss a criminal action after
it has been brought. Likewise, the vindication of a victim's resti-
tutive and retributive interests may be frustrated by the prosecu-
tor's discretionary decisions to charge a single offense where the
evidence would warrant charging several offenses or to charge a
lesser offense than the evidence warrants because such decisions
may narrow the sanctions which may be subsequently imposed
on a convicted offender. The availability of a private prosecution
would mean that the victim could initiate a criminal action in or-
der to obtain restitution and retribution even when the public
prosecutor decides not to charge or not to charge the full range of
possible offenses.
The availability of private prosecution could also benefit victims
by providing a remedy for prosecutorial charging decisions that
are the product of bias against certain classes of victims. A re-
view of the existing literature indicates that factors related to the
characteristics of the victim and the nature of the victimization
influence prosecutorial charging decisions 1 6 and that prosecutors
116. On the basis of an observational study of the New York County District
Attorney's Office, one researcher found that victim characteristics such as gender,
race, occupation, appearance, and life style were significant factors in
prosecutorial screening of felony arrests. The influence of victim characteristics
was not attributed to "outright prosecutorial bias." Rather it was attributed to
stereotypical judgment by prosecutors about whether juries and judges would find
the victim credible and sympathetic. Starks, The Impact of Victim Assessment on
Prosecutors' Screening Decisions: The Case of the New York County District Attor-
ney's Office, 16 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 225, 228-38 (1981-82). Other studies have also
found a relationship between victim characteristics and prosecutorial charging de-
cisions. See F. MILLER, supra note 113, at 174-76 (race of victim may be a factor);
K. WILLIAMS, supra note 106, at 15-19 (victim characteristics such as alcohol abuse
and gender are significant in prosecutorial screening decisions); Paternoster, Race
of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South
Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 767-85 (1983) (The decision of a prose-
cutor to seek the death penalty in a homicide case in North Carolina is signifi-
cantly related to the race of the victim with the probability of the prosecutor's
seeking the death penalty being greater in cases of black offenders who kill white
victims than in cases of black offenders who kill black victims. This differential
treatment by race cannot be accounted for by the type of homicide committed or
other possible aggravating factors). See also McDonald, Criminal Justice and the
Victim, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM, supra note 1, at 42 ("[T]he appear-
ance, social class, character and other attributes of the victim are part of that vast
body of extralegal factors which determine the quality of justice that is dispensed
* . . the victim").
At least one study indicates that prosecutorial charging decisions are influenced
by the prosecutor's evaluation of the victim's responsibility for the crime-
whether the victim provoked or precipitated the crime. K. WILLIAMS, supra note
106, at 13-15. Along similar lines, studies indicate that a criminal case is more
are more responsive to requests for prosecution from victims in-
volved in certain types of crimes than in other types of crimes." 7
While the exercise of prosecutorial charging discretion in a man-
ner that reflects bias against certain classes of victims may not be
an abuse of discretion or even irrational, it is questionable when
the evidence would permit prosecution and the victim has re-
quested prosecution." 8
The right to bring a private prosecution, however, might prove
to be of only symbolic value to many victims. Victims who desire
to bring a private prosecution generally would need to obtain
counsel to institute and conduct the prosecution on their behalf-
the cost of retaining counsel might be a significant economic bar-
rier to many of these victims, particularly those of limited finan-
cial means. It would be possible to create systems for furnishing
counsel to indigent victims for the purpose of bringing a private
prosecution just as systems have been created to provide counsel
to indigent defendants, although it is somewhat doubtful that re-
sources necessary to do this would be forthcoming. Nonetheless
the existence of an opportunity for a victim to bring offenders
before the criminal courts could still serve as a useful safeguard
and safety valve if the prosecutor was unwilling to take action.
b. Public Prosecution and the Potential Defendant's Interests
From the potential defendant's perspective, the impact of au-
likely to be pursued if the victim and the offender were strangers than if they had
some kind of prior relationship. See FELONY ARRESTS, supra note 113, at 136; K.
WILLIAMS, supra note 106, at 21-24. Cf. McIntyre, Study of Judicial Dominance of
the Charging Process, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 463, 477 (1968).
117. The research literature indicates that the public prosecutor is more re-
sponsive to victim requests for prosecutions when the case is perceived as involv-
ing a serious crime than when the case is perceived as involving a non-serious
crime. See F. MILLER, supra note 113, at 297-337; Hall, supra note 113, at 948-53.
118. In cases where the evidence would permit prosecution and the victim
wishes prosecution, prosecutorial charging decisions influenced by factors pertain-
ing to the characteristics of the victim are highly problematic. For example, to the
extent that the victim's socio-economic status influences these decisions directly
or indirectly, the specter of "class based" justice for victims is raised. McDonald,
supra note 10, at 300. If the evidence would permit prosecution and the victim
wishes to prosecute, prosecutorial charging decisions influenced by the nature of
the victimization such as the victim's responsibility for the crime and the exist-
ence of a prior relationship between victim and offender are also problematic.
Prosecutorial charging decisions based on judgments concerning the victim's re-
sponsibility for the crime are likely to be quite subjective and, therefore, perhaps
erroneous. In addition, there is growing recognition that individuals are entitled to
be protected from crimes committed by spouses, lovers, friends, or neighbors, as
well as crimes committed by strangers. Similarly, if the evidence would permit
prosecution and the victim wishes prosecution, negative prosecutorial charging de-
cisions are problematic when based upon a judgment by the prosecutor that the
offense is minor since an offense which is minor to the prosecutor may be serious
to the victim.
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thorizing victim-initiated prosecution would undoubtedly be seen
as detrimental. There were abuses historically associated with
private prosecutions," 9 and it can be anticipated that objections
would be made to the revival of private prosecutions on the
ground that they might be abused.
One possible abuse of the private prosecution would be the
bringing by the victim of a malicious and unfounded prosecution.
The existence of a civil remedy for malicious private prosecutions
might act as a deterrent to such prosecutions. In most states,
public prosecutors are immune from malicious prosecution suits,
but if private prosecutions were to be authorized, immunity from
malicious prosecution suits would not have to be extended to vic-
tims functioning as private prosecutors.120 An additional deter-
rent might be the assignment of trial costs and defense counsel
fees against the private prosecutor who brings a malicious
prosecution. 12 1
Another possible abuse of the private prosecution would be the
practice of compounding and other comparable practices. A vic-
tim might use the threat of instituting a criminal proceeding as
leverage to exact a financial settlement or some other considera-
tion from a potential defendant. Conversely, a potential defend-
ant might pay the victim or might threaten the victim in order to
induce the victim not to prosecute. There are currently statutes
in almost all states prohibiting compounding and similar prac-
tices, 122 but the revival of private prosecutions might well produce
a growth in these practices necessitating their more vigorous
enforcement.
From the standpoint of the potential defendant's interests, how-
ever, the chief apprehension about private prosecutions brought
by victims is that they would reduce the impartiality and fairness
of the charging process. This apprehension arises from an image
of the victim as an overly vindictive individual and an image of
the prosecutor as a disinterested, objective individua1' 23-images
119. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
120. See Private Prosecution, supra note 112, at 232-33. See also Annot. 118
A.L.R. 1450 (1939).
121. See Private Prosecution, supra note 112, at 233.
122. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-7 (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 153 (West Supp.
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-108 (1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-1 (1978); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 215.45 (McKinney 1975).
123. In passing upon the legality of private prosecutors, courts have expressed
concern about the vindictiveness of victims and a corresponding faith in the objec-
that do not always correspond to reality.124 Moreover, it is not
necessarily appropriate to apply the same standards and norms to
victims' decisions to prosecute and to public prosecutors' deci-
sions to prosecute. Public prosecutors represent the interests of
the state and have the responsibility of seeing that justice is done,
while victims simply represent their own individual interests.
Once the proposition is accepted that victims may have restitu-
tive and retributive interests as arising from the crime deserving
of vindication through a criminal prosecution of the offender, dif-
ferences in the handling of criminal cases deriving from differ-
ences in the interests of victims are inevitable. The troublesome
aspect of this position is that a victim's desire to prosecute may
be related not to restitutive and retributive interests arising from
the crime but rather to motives extraneous to these interests.
tiveness and lack of bias of public prosecutors. See, e.g., People v. Birnberg, 112
Misc. 2d 870, 874-75, 447 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (1981); State v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 44,
50 (Mo. 1976); People v. Municipal Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 205-06, 103 Cal. Rptr.
645, 654-55 (1972); State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 356, 218 N.W. 367, 369 (1928);
Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 445-53, 37 N.W. 244, 245-48 (1888). This is also a com-
mon theme in the literature about private prosecutions. See Comment, supra note
28, at 781-83; Private Prosecution, supra note 112, at 1173-74.
124. On the one hand, there is evidence that contradicts the perception that vic-
tims are invariably unduly vindictive. For example, one study of rape victims
found that victims in the sample were more concerned with how they were treated
than what happened to their offenders and concluded that "though victims want
something done to the defendant, they are not a bloodthirsty lot." D. Kelly, supra
note 94, at 24-29. Another relevant study is the evaluation of a Dade County pre-
trial settlement program where victims participated in pretrial settlement confer-
ences which likewise found that victims did not demand the severest possible
punishment of defendants. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, observers of the criminal justice system have reported that
public prosecutors are not always objective and unbiased. As one commentator
has declared:
The prosecutor is not merely a representative of public justice. He is an
official administering a bureaucracy that serves a variety of objectives-
investigative, adjudicative, administrative, and political. However high-
minded he may be in exercising his function, his roles as advocate and ad-
ministrator make it difficult for him to be genuinely neutral and to weigh
impartially the facts and law and equities bearing on the many decisions
he must make.
Goldstein, supra note 19, at 555. See also Vorenberg, supra note 113, at 1553, 1557-
58.
The courts have similarly recognized that public prosecutors are not always ob-
jective and unbiased. Thus, the use by prosecutors of their charging discretion to
enhance charges against a defendant in retaliation for a defendant's exercise of a
constitutional or statutory right has been characterized as vindictiveness and held
to be a violation of federal constitutional due process guarantees. See, e.g.,
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25-29 (1974). For an examination of the formula-
tion and application of the federal constitutional prohibition against prosecutorial
vindictiveness in charging decisions, see Schwartz, The Limits of Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness, 69 I.A. L. REV. 127 (1983).
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c. Private Prosecution, the Interests of the State, and the Public
Prosecutor's Charging Discretion
From the perspective of the state's interests, a determination
and evaluation of the impact of allowing victims to bring private
prosecutions involves a consideration primarily of its impact upon
the authority of the public prosecutor who acts as the state's rep-
resentative in deciding whether to initiate a criminal action.
Since the basis for and effect of negative prosecutorial charging
decisions with respect to the state's interests vary, the impact of
authorizing private prosecutions by victims may vary depending
upon the type of decision involved. Negative prosecutorial charg-
ing decisions may be grouped in a variety of categories for pur-
poses of illustrating this potential variation in the impact of victim
initiated private prosecutions.
One category might consist of negative prosecutorial decisions
that reflect judgments about the prosecutorial merit of the case.
A prosecutor sometimes decides not to charge an offense because
the alleged facts do not constitute a crime, or the admissible evi-
dence is insufficient either to establish probable cause or to sup-
port a conviction.125 It is unclear to what degree victim-initiated
prosecutions would hinder the prosecutor's ability to screen out
"weak" cases. Private prosecutions brought by the victim would
be subject to grand jury and preliminary hearing requirements
and would have to meet the same evidentiary standards as a pros-
ecution brought by a public prosecutor. Nevertheless, a victim
who usually would not be a lawyer and has a direct interest in the
case would probably be more inclined to institute a criminal ac-
tion in a weak case than a public prosecutor. Hence, the fre-
quency of weak cases might increase with private prosecution. 12 6
Another category might consist of negative prosecutorial charg-
125. For a description of the prosecutorial charging process which produces de-
cisions in this category, see F. MILLER, supra note 113, at 11-19, 21-43; P. GREEN-
WOOD, supra note 11, at 94-96; Neuberger, supra note 113, at 502-03; Rabin, supra
note 113, at 1061-64. Accepted standards of professional conduct require prosecu-
tors to screen cases for prosecutorial merit in order to avoid commencing a crimi-
nal prosecution when the charges are not supported by probable cause and when
the admissible evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction. See ABA PROSE-
CUTION STANDARDS, supra note 93, Standard 3.9(a) and commentary, at 7-8. See
also Jacoby, supra note 113, at 82-83, 86; Vorenberg, supra note 113, at 1547-48.
126. One observer reports that the English system of private prosecution under
which the police and citizen rather than a public prosecutor institute many crimi-
nal proceedings does not screen out unnecessary or unfounded criminal actions as
well as the American system of public prosecution. Kaufman, Criminal Procedure
ing decisions that reflect the prosecutor's judgment that non-pros-
ecution or something less than full prosecution is consistent with
the purposes of the criminal law and the goals of the criminal
sanctioning process. For example, prosecutors sometimes decide
not to charge or not to charge fully because of undue harm to the
suspect and the availability of other effective alternatives.1 27 In
these kinds of cases, restoration of private prosecution would per-
mit victims to overturn prosecutorial charging decisions which
were in fact consistent with, or at least not contrary to, the inter-
ests of the state. Even if the prosecutor's decision, however, is in
the interest of the state, it may be contrary to the interests of the
victim, and such cases would raise the fundamental question of
which interests should prevail in the event of such a conflict.
Still another category might consist of negative prosecutorial
charging decisions that are based upon administrative considera-
tions. For example, prosecutors frequently make negative
prosecutorial decisions in order to conserve scarce prosecutorial
resources and control crowded court dockets.' 28 The victim-initi-
ated prosecution could be regarded as a needed and desirable
check on prosecutorial charging discretion, insofar as it leads to
decisions based upon administrative considerations which neither
promote the victim's interests nor serve the purposes of the crimi-
nal law and the goals of the criminal sanctioning process.
Overburdened prosecutors' offices and criminal courts, however,
constitute a very real problem. On the one hand, victim-initiated
private prosecutions might substantially further the strain on the
in England and the United States: Comparisons in Initiating Prosecutions, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 26, 35-36 (1980).
127. For a description of the prosecutorial charging process which produces de-
cisions in this category, see F. MILLER, supra note 113, at 186-90, 207-52; Rabin,
supra note 113, at 1056-61; see also Jacoby, supra note 113, at 84-85; LaFave, supra
note 113, at 534-35; Vorenberg, supra note 113, at 1551-52.
128. Professor Goldstein has described the adminstrative concerns, especially
case pressures, that lead to negative prosecutorial charging decisions as follows:
When he functions as an administrator, the prosecutor's concerns may
also focus less on justice in the particular case than on using his resources
and the court's time effectively. The rape case may be reduced to inde-
cent assault and the street robbery to larceny; multiple burglary offenders
may be charged with only one offense; and many offenses are not prose-
cuted at all because they fall into the "nuisance" category-the cases of
battered wives and battered children and battered sweethearts, neighbor-
hood disputes, bad checks, and consumer frauds. Prosecutors regard
themselves as authorized to pursue their own adminstrative course con-
cerning their case loads, their policy preferences as to the relative impor-
tance of the crime charged, the correctional dispositions to be sought, and
the extent to which they should trade immunity from prosecution for in-
formation to be used in other cases.
Goldstein, supra note 19, at 535. See Rabin, supra note 113, at 1037-52. See also
Jacoby, supra note 113, at 83-84; LaFave, supra note 113, at 533-34; Vorenberg,
supra note 113, at 1548-49.
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criminal courts by increasing the number of criminal cases that
must be processed, depending upon the frequency with which
criminal actions would be instituted by victims. On the other
hand, if victims were authorized to bring and conduct criminal
prosecutions, public prosecutors might be able to conserve their
scarce resources for cases that cannot, would not, or should not
be privately prosecuted.
Yet another category might consist of negative prosecutorial
charging decisions that constitute abuses of discretion or are
otherwise inequitable. This category would encompass decisions
which are the product of corruption, political or personal favorit-
ism, laxness, and clearly impermissible criteria such as the poten-
tial defendant's race or sex, and this category would also
encompass decisions that produce unequal treatment of similarly
situated potential defendants because of inconsistent exercise of
prosecutorial charging discretion.129 A concomitant of the broad
and largely uncontrolled discretionary power of prosecutors in
making charging decisions is that this discretion will be exercised
in a manner that constitutes an abuse of discretion or is other-
wise inequitable. 130 Given this risk, it is conceivable that the vic-
tim-initated prosecution could provide a useful and needed check
on prosecutorial charging discretion. It is also conceivable that
129. As Professor Davis has stated:
Theoretically possible is a system of enforcement in only a fraction of
the cases in which enforcement would be appropriate, with discretionary
selections made in such a way that all the cases prosecuted are more de-
serving of prosecution than any of the cases not prosecuted.
The degree of probability of such an achievement is, I think, the same as
the degree of probability that all public administrators will act with 100
percent integrity, will never be influenced by political considerations, will
never tend to favor their friends, will never take into account their own
advantage or disadvantage in exercising discretionary power, will always
eschew ethically doubtful positions, will always subordinate their own so-
cial values to those adopted by the legislative body, and will make every
decision on a strictly rational basis.
Davis, supra note 113, at 167. See F. MILLER, supra note 113, at 174-76; Gifford,
supra note 113, passim; Vorenberg, supra note 113, at 1554-57; Private Prosecution,
supra note 112, at nn.16 & 20.
130. There is an extensive literature dealing with the need for and desirability
of various kinds of mechanisms for regulating prosecutorial changing discretion in
order to reduce the danger of exercises of discretion that constitute abuse or are
inequitable. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS 10-21, 24 (1973); P. GREENWOOD, supra note
113, at 116-19; Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutional Dis-
cretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 4; LaFave, supra note 113, at 535-39; Vorenberg, supra
note 113, at 1360-1572; cf. F. MILLER, supra note 113, at 93-245.
victim-initiated private prosecution would do little or nothing to
reduce this risk.
The preceding categories of negative prosecutorial charging de-
cisions are admittedly somewhat arbitrary; an individual decision
may fall within more than one of these categories; and these cate-
gories by no means exhaust the possiblities for categorization of
decisions. 131 The broad and largely uncontrolled discretionary
power of the public prosecutor to make discretionary decisions
with respect to the initiation of criminal actions is obviously a
complex subject and the need for and desirability of such discre-
tion has been much debated. Suffice it to say that generalizations
about the impact of victim-initiated private prosecutions-what
their impact would be and whether their impact would be benefi-
cial or detrimental in terms of the interests of the state-are haz-
ardous. What is clear is that in view of the well established
control by the prosecutor over the initation of criminal actions,
the widespread revival of private prosecutions by victims without
the consent or approval of the public prosecutor would require a
fundamental reorientation and restructuring of the public prose-
cution function. As a practical matter, for this reason alone, the
recognition of a right on the part of a victim to bring a criminal
prosecution would seem unlikely when the prosecutor has de-
cided not to prosecute and objects to private prosecution.
2. Modified Private Prosecution
It must be stressed at this point that private prosecution could
be revived in a modified form with various limitations. Private
prosecutions by victims need not be authorized in all criminal
cases. Its use could be confined to cases involving certain types
of offenses which victims are likely to want prosecuted but which
public prosecutors are likely to be reluctant to prosecute, being
the best candidates for private prosecution.132
131. For a discussion of other frequently mentioned reasons for negative
prosecutorial charging decisions, see F. MILLER, supra note 113, at 173-85, 253-59;
LaFave, supra note 113, at 533-35; Vorenberg, supra note 113, at 1551-53.
132. As Goldstein has pointed out:
There are some obvious categories of cases in which, under current con-
ditions, private enforcement may be more likely to occur than public en-
forcement. These include the crimes among friends and neighbors who
assault and steal from each other, the crimes committed by business peo-
ple who cheat and defraud their customers and clients, the crimes of strict
liability involving health and safety, and public torts. There are institu-
tional candidates for private prosecution as well: retail stores in shoplift-
ing cases; banks in embezzlement cases; public health and safety agencies
assuming the role of proxy victims under regulatory statutes; public inter-
est groups, trade association, and labor unions serving as proxy victims
and attending to the criminal law enacted out of concern for their
constituents.
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Private prosecution by victims on a unilateral basis also need
not be authorized. Its use could be conditioned on some type of
prior approval or authorization. One alternative is to make notifi-
cation or approval by the public prosecutor a prerequisite for a
private prosecution.133 This alternative would allow a victim to in-
stitute a criminal proceeding where the prosecutor had no basic
objection to prosecution, but would leave unresolved genuine con-
flicts between victims and prosecutors as to whether a prosecu-
tion should be undertaken.
Another alternative is to make negative prosecutorial charging
decisions subject to judicial review when sought by the victim.134
This alternative has the advantage of providing a judicial evalua-
tion, which is presumably neutral and detached, of the prosecu-
tor's decision not to prosecute or not to prosecute fully contrary
to the expressed wishes of the victim. Traditionally, however, the
judiciary has been very reluctant to review prosecutorial charging
decisions. 3 5
Goldstein, supra note 19, at 559.
133. Professor Goldstein, who is the most forceful advocate of an approach
which would condition the bringing of a private prosecution on the consent or ap-
proval of the public prosecutor, has stated:
A system combining private prosecution with some degree of public
control can easily be imagined. It might, for example, permit the private
prosecutor to invoke the criminal law by filing a complaint before a magis-
trate, with notice to the district attorney so that he may serve a "screening
and centralizing" function even as he delegates prosecution to others. If
there is probable cause, the prosecution would continue unless the prose-
cutor intervened and sought to dismiss the case or to prosecute it himself.
His decision to prosecute would be unreviewable and his motion to dis-
miss a private prosecution would prevail if he had rationally persuasive
grounds for dismissal. In time, the prosecutor would probably develop cri-
teria for the classes of cases he would allow routinely to be brought by
private parties, as well as those he would take over or move to dismiss. In
such a system, it would be essential to provide flexible remedies as alter-
natives to imprisonment, not only to reduce the strain on public resources
but also because the key to minor criminal cases of the sort most appro-
priate for private prosecution is often found in "civil" remedies, mediation,
and arbitration.
Goldstein, supra note 19, at 560.
134. See Gifford, supra note 113, at 716-17; Vorenberg, supra note 113, at 1568.
135. Among the current barriers to full judicial review of negative prosecutorial
charging decisions at the request of the victim is the separation of powers doc-
trine. Federal courts have interpreted this doctrine as requiring judicial deference
to prosecutorial charging decisions. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d
479, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
Another current barrier to full judicial review of negative prosecutorial charging
decisions at the request of the victim are standing requirements as currently in-
Still another alternative, and the one that is most appealing, is
to establish a mechanism whereby the victim could challenge a
negative prosecutorial charging decision by directly petitioning a
grand jury to initiate a prosecution. Under this approach, if a vic-
tim asked the grand jury to initiate a prosecution, the public pros-
ecutor would be forced to articulate his or her reasons for
refusing to prosecute, and the grand jury could then assess their
validity in light of the victim's desire for prosecution. One of the
grand jury's historic functions is to investigate criminal cases and
to bring to trial individuals justly accused of a crime. 136 There is
also some precedent for and experience with victims presenting a
charge or complaint directly to the grand jury.137 In passing upon
terpreted and applied. An especially troublesome decision in this regard is Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), in which the United States Supreme
Court stated that "in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a ju-
dicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." For
a critique of this decision, see Gifford, supra note 113, at 712-14; Goldstein, supra
note 19, at 550-52.
Still another current barrier to full judicial review of negative prosecutorial
charging decisions at the request of the victim are the requirements associated
with mandamus actions, the victim's chief procedural vehicle for obtaining such
review. It is often said that the mandamus remedy is available only to compel a
public official to perform a ministerial or mandatory act, and courts have refused
to issue writs of mandamus ordering public prosecutors to prosecute on the
ground that the prosecutorial charging decision is discretionary. See, e.g., Pugach
v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Taliaferro v. Locke, 182 Cal. App. 2d 752, 6
Cal. Rptr. 813 (1960). In some jurisdictions a writ of mandamus may be issued if
the public prosecutor's failure to prosecute is an "abuse of discretion," but such
abuse is not easy to establish. See, e.g., Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90, 40 A.2d 319,
321 (1944); Ackerman v. Houston, 4 S. Ariz. 293, 43 P.2d 194 (1935). For a fuller dis-
cussion of mandamus requirements see F. MILLER, supra note 113, at 331-34; Gif-
ford, supra note 113, at 714-16. See also Comment, The Confrontation of the
Legislative and Executive Branches: An Examination of the Constitutional Bal-
ance of Powers and the Role of the Attorney General, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 331
(1984). Among the practical barriers to full judicial review of negative
prosecutorial charging decisions at the request of the victim is the difficulty of for-
mulating judicial standards for weighing the myriad factors that can enter into a
prosecutor's charging decision. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v.
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1973); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479,
481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967). There is also the difficulty of ascertaining the prosecutor's
reasons for and motives in making a charging decision. See Gifford, supra note
113, at 683. Professor Vorenberg has urged that public prosecutors develop guide-
lines for making charging decisions and has suggested that the existence of such
guidelines might make the courts more willing to review these decisions. Voren-
berg, supra note 113, at 1569.
136. See State ex rel. Miller v. Smith, 285 S.E.2d 500, 504 (W. Va. 1981); L. FRIED-
MAN, THE GRAND JURY: SHIELD OR SWORD (1972). See generally Gelber, A Reap-
praisal of the Grand Jury Concept, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. For a
history of the grand jury, see EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY (1906) and R. YOUNGER,
THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 134-54, 224-46 (1963).
137. At common law citizens had the right to communicate directly with the
grand jury to present a complaint or charge. See United States v. Smyth, 104 F.
Supp. 383, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 93, 40 A.2d 319, 322
(1944). In some jurisdictions, such a right still exists. See, e.g., Brack v. Wells, 184
[Vol. 11: 117, 1984] Expanding the Role of the Victim
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
a victim's request for the initiation of a criminal prosecution over
the objection of the prosecutor, the grand jury would not be able
to rely on the investigative assistance of the prosecutor's office as
it normally does in a criminal case, but provision could be made
for the appointment of special independent prosecutors or investi-
gators to assist the grand jury.138
3. Notification of Victims Concerning Prosecutorial Charging
Decisions
Even if victims do not have the right to initiate a criminal action
or to obtain review of a negative prosecutorial charging decision,
they can and should at a minimum be informed of prosecutorial
charging decisions pertaining to their case. There is in fact a de-
veloping consensus that victims should be informed of prose-
cutorial charging decisions. 13 9 Legislation requiring victim
notification is being considered in several states, and victim notifi-
cation is a major component of victim/witness assistance
programs.14o
B. Pre-Trial Stage: Guilty Plea Negotiations
Just as the crime victim usually has no formal role in the initia-
tion of a criminal action, the victim usually has no formal role
Md. 86, 93, 40 A.2d 319, 321-22; State ex rel. Miller v. Smith, 285 S.E.2d 500, 504-05
(W. Va. 1981); Holt v. Yarborough, 112 Tex. 179, 186-87, 245 S.W. 676, 678-79 (1922).
See also Petition of Thomas, 434 A.2d 503, 506-07 (Me. 1981) (private citizen cannot
present evidence to grand jury unless court's permission obtained). In other juris-
dictions, however, such a right does not exist. See, e.g., People v. Sears, 49 Ill. 2d
14, 29-31, 273 N.E.2d 380, 388-89 (1971). See also United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167,
172 (5th Cir. 1965) (United States Attorney must sign grand jury indictment or has
discretion with respect to signing of indictment). For a compilation of cases deal-
ing with the individual's right to present a complaint or a charge to the grand jury,
see Ann., 156 A.L.R. 330.
138. In a few states the appointment of special investigators at the request of
the grand jury may be statutorily authorized or the court may have the authority
to make such appointments in the exercise of its supervisory power. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-5(b) (1982); Wayne County Prosecutor v. Wayne County
Circuit Judge, 387 Mich. 784 (1972).
139. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 63-64; ABA
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 2, 10. N.Y. CRIME VICTIM REPORT, supra note 6, at 72-
73. NOVA (National Organization for Victim Assistance), Rights for Victims and
Witnesses 4 (undated) [hereinafter cited as NOVA].
140. See ABA VICTIM/WrrNEss LEGISLATION, supra note 12, at 28-29; BUREAU OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 3. See, e.g., Early, A Detailed
Description of a Case Notification System, 16 PROSECUTOR 13 (1981); see also ABA
GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 10.
with respect to decision-making during the pre-trial stage. A large
proportion of all criminal actions-between 85 and 90 percent in
many jurisdictions-are disposed of at this stage by guilty plea. 141
Many guilty pleas are the product of plea negotiation or bargain-
ing between prosecutor and defense counsel. 42 The prosecutor is
free to decide whether to plea bargain and has considerable dis-
cretion in negotiating a guilty plea.' 43 The normal pattern is for
the prosecutor to agree to drop or reduce particular charges or to
make sentencing recommendations in exchange for the defend-
ant's agreement to plead guilty to a particular charge. The most
common explanation for the frequency with which the prosecutor
engages in plea bargaining with defense counsel is that heavy
criminal court caseloads combined with the scarcity of prose-
cutorial resources necessitate the disposition of cases without
trial through guilty pleas.'" Yet studies indicate that the mainte-
141. The commonly accepted figure with respect to criminal action concluded
by guilty pleas has been 90 percent. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9
(1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT]. A
study of the guilty plea process in 20 states found that the cases disposed of by
guilty plea varied a great deal from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The mode, how-
ever, for all jurisdictions combined was between 85 and 90 percent. H. MILLER, J.
CRAMER, & W. MCDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 16-24 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as MILLER STUDY].
142. See MILLER STUDY, supra note 141, at 28; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 9. FELONY ARRESTS, supra note 113, at 18-19. For
descriptions of the plea negotiation process see also M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAIN-
ING: THE EXPERIENCE OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978)
[hereinafter cited as M. HFUMANN]; D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION, THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); A. ROSETr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE
BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE (1978); Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968).
143. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); see also ABA, PRO-
JECT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY,
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 93, Standard 3.1 (1968); NAT'L COLLEGE OF
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROSECUTOR 1-4 (1977); NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 25.1 and commentary at 417 (Nat'l Dist. Attor-
ney's Ass'n 1979). See generally, A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY:
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981).
144. See M. HEuMANN, supra note 142, at 24-25. The literature on plea bargain-
ing has generally accepted plea bargaining as a necessary product of case pres-
sure. See, e.g., J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS 1-6 (2d ed. 1982);
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 142, at 10.
Some of the United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with guilty pleas
accept case pressure as a justification for plea bargaining. See Blackledge v. Al-
lison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ("Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world,
the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are impor-
tant components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered
they can benefit all concerned .... Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and
scarce resources"). Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ('The disposi-
tion of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused,
sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the ad-
ministration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every
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nance of' manageable dockets does not wholly explain this
phenomenon.145
Victims rarely play a formal role in plea negotiations and have
largely been excluded from these negotiations. Similarly, victims
rarely play a formal role in the judicial hearing at which the judge
decides whether to accept a tendered guilty plea by the defend-
ant. There is relatively little empirical research about the infor-
mal influence of victim attitudes and wishes on the prosecutor's
discretionary plea bargaining decisions and the judge's accept-
ance of negotiated pleas.146 Model standards and goals respecting
negotiated guilty pleas do not contemplate a role for the victim in
the plea negotiation process147 and commentaries on the plea ne-
gotiations have largely overlooked the role of the victim. 48
The outcome of the majority of criminal prosecutions that end
in a guilty plea is effectively determined by guilty plea negotia-
tions between prosecutor and defense counsel as to the offense or
offenses to which the defendant will plead and the sentence
which the prosecutor will recommend to the court-a recommen-
dation which the court usually follows.149 Accordingly, terms of a
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the states and the federal gov-
ernment would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court
facilities").
145. A study of the Connecticut trial courts by Milton Heumann has cast doubt
upon the explanation of plea bargaining as a response to the large caseload into
criminal courts. He found that historically trial of criminal cases was the excep-
tion rather than the rule that there was no substantial difference in the percentage
of cases tried in courts with a high volume of cases and courts with a low volume
of cases. See M. HEUMANN, supra note 142, at 27-33. He explains plea bargaining
as an outgrowth of an adaptation process which leads to a belief on the part of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges that plea bargaining is an appropriate
means of disposing of many criminal cases. Id. at 156-57.
146. But see Hall, supra note 113, at 954-56. In Nashville, Tennessee, "victim's
desires are considered by the district attorney's office in deciding whether to sub-
mit an offer to defense counsel and whether to accept a tendered plea from the
defendant." Id. McDonald, supra note 68, at 103. "Observations in ten jurisdic-
tions suggest that the victim is presently being given either actual control over or
a heavy influence on ... plea bargaining decisions. But this practice occurs on a
sub rosa informal, nonroutine basis, depending upon the prosecutor or judge and
what type of crime is involved." Id.
147. Hall, supra note 113, at 953.
148. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 143, at Standard 3.1-3.3 and commen-
tary, at 60-78 (1968).
149. See MILLER STUDy, supra note 141, at 203-04. The judge, however, is not
bound by the plea bargain and can refuse to follow the prosecutor's sentencing
recommendations. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); Vis-
conti v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 417 (D. Mass. 1978); State v. Leisy, 295 N.W.2d
715 (Neb. 1980); James v. State, 380 So. 2d 994 (Ala. Ct. App. 1979).
negotiated guilty plea have a bearing upon the victim's ability to
obtain the desired restitution or retribution, and a case can be
made for giving victims the right to have some input into and con-
trol over the plea negotiation process so that they can protect
those interests. 5 0
Victim participation in the plea negotiation process can be
achieved through affording the victim the right to actually be
present at and take part in the negotiations between prosecutor
and defense counsel. It can also be achieved by affording the vic-
tim the right to consult with or submit a statement to the prosecu-
tor as to the impact of the crime and his or her views as to any
proposed guilty plea agreement. There is resistance to victim par-
ticipation in plea negotiation.151 One concern is that victim partic-
ipation would result in fewer cases being plea bargained based
upon a fear that victims will be overly vindictive and will object to
charging and sentencing concessions by the prosecutor in ex-
change for a plea of guilty by the defendant. This is of concern to
defendants because it could mean that more defendants will go to
trial, be convicted, and receive heavier sentences; it is of concern
to prosecutors primarily because they place so much reliance on
negotiated guilty pleas for more efficient case processing. An-
other concern is that the victim who is actually present at and
takes part in plea negotiations between the prosecutor and de-
fense counsel will be disruptive.
There is an evaluation of at least one program designed to in-
crease victim participation in the plea negotiation process by per-
mitting victims to attend pre-trial settlement conferences which
indicates that these concerns may be exaggerated. According to
the evaluation of this program, the victim participants did not
make insistent demands for severe punishment of the defendants;
they did not prove to be obstreperous; and no significant differ-
ences in settlement or trial rate between test and control cases
were identified5 2 While this type of program must be further
150. As one observer has pointed out:
[Plea] . . . bargains generally produce sentences that are significantly less
than could be received under the law. If the victim is interested in retri-
bution, he may be frustrated by the imposition of a low sentence without
explanation of the reasons for leniency or the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in the process of reaching a disposition. If the victim is not
interested in retribution, there is little other satisfaction to be gained. Vic-
tims seldom get an apology, seldom are reconciled with the offender and
seldom receive restitution.
DuBow and Becker, Patterns of Criminal Advocacy, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE
VICTIM, supra note 1, at 150 (citations omitted).
151. See W. KERSTETTER & A. HEINZ, supra note 100, at 15-16, 126. See also Gold-
stein, supra note 19, at 557-58.
152. See W. KERSTETTER & A. HEINZ, supra note 100, at 93-94, 98-108, 128, 130. It
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replicated and evaluated before any definite conclusions can be
drawn about the effect of victim participation in the plea negotia-
tion process, preliminary data suggests that programs to increase
victim participation in plea negotiations can be successful.
Even when, however, the victim has an opportunity to partici-
pate in the plea negotiation process, the terms of the plea agree-
ment eventually arrived at may be contrary to the wishes and
interests of the victim unless the victim has the power to veto the
agreement. In the absence of such veto power, victim input into
the judicial decision with respect to acceptance of the guilty pleas
would seem necessary to ensure that the victim's wishes and in-
terests are considered. 153 Input could take the form of an oral
statement by the victim at the judicial hearing at which the nego-
tiated guilty plea is offered by the defendant, and input could also
take the form of submission of a written statement to the court by
the victim informing the court of the impact of the crime on the
victim and the victim's views as to the terms of the negotiated
plea agreement.154
Here again, if there is no mechanism for some victim input into
and control of the plea negotiation process, the victim at a mini-
mum should have the right to be notified of decisions. There
does, in fact, seem to be general agreement that victims should be
notified of the outcome of the plea negotiation process, and such
notification is increasingly being statutorily or administratively
required. 5 5
should be noted, however, that many victims did not attend the pre-trial settle-
ment conferences and their role "seems to have been basically that of observers
with a limited and structured input." Id. at 128-29. See also supra note 100.
153. As a matter of federal constitutional law, a guilty plea must be voluntary
and intelligent to be valid. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970);
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). In accepting a guilty plea federal
court judges must follow the procedures of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure which are designed to insure that the plea is voluntary, intelligent,
and accurate. While state court judges need not follow federal plea taking proce-
dures, state procedures must satisfy federal constitutional requirements. See, e.g.,
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
There is a debate over whether trial court judges should review guilty pleas on
grounds other than their compliance with federal constitutional requirements.
Compare A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 143, with Uviller, Reassessing the Role of the
Trial Judge in Verdictless Dispositions of Criminal Cases, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1166
(1983).
154. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-4.1-4-1, 35-5-6-1.5-35-5-6-2 (West 1978). See
also ABA VIcnM/WrrNEss LEGISLATION, supra note 12, at 46-47; PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 63-64.
155. See, e.g., MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-812 (West Supp. 1982); ABA Vic-
C. Trial Stage
Although the limitation of the crime victim's role in a criminal
proceeding to that of a witness has meant the exclusion of the vic-
tim from a formal role in the initiation of criminal proceedings
and from decision-making at the pre-trial stage, there are a
number of states where a victim is permitted to retain an attorney
to function as a private prosecutor at trial.156 In many jurisdic-
TIM/WITNESS LEGISLATION, supra note 12, at 28-29; PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 63-64; ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 2, 9-10; NOVA,
supra note 138, at 4.
156. The states in which it appears that a private citizen is expressly permitted
to retain counsel to act as a private prosecutor at trial include the following: Ala-
bama: Langley v. State, 383 So. 2d 868 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 873
(1980); Handley v. State, 214 Ala. 172, 106 So. 692 (1926); California: People v. Pow-
ell, 87 Cal. 348, 25 P. 481 (1891); Colorado: Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 54, 238 P.25
(1925); Florida: Oglesby v. State, 83 Fla. 132, 90 So. 825 (1922); Georgia: Jackson v.
State, 156 Ga. 842, 120 S.E. 535 (1925); Hawaii: Territory v. Rubello, 20 Haw. 7
(1910); Territory v. Soga, 20 Haw. 71 (1910); Idaho: State v. Scott, 72 Id. 202, 239 P.2d
258 (1951); State v. Steers, 12 Id. 174, 85 P. 104 (1906); Illinois: People v. Farnsley,
53 Ill. 2d 537, 293 N.E.2d 600 (1973); People v. Hortenbower, 283 Ill. 591, 119 N.E. 605
(1918); Hayner v. People, 213 Ill. 142, 72 N.E. 792 (1905); Indiana: Williams v. State,
188 Ind. 283, 123 N.E. 209 (1919); Tull v. State ex rel. Glessner, 99 Ind. 238 (1884);
Iowa: State v. Shreves, 81 Iowa 623, 47 N.W. 899 (1981), but see State v. Jensen, 178
Ia. 1098, 160 N.W. 832 (1917); Kansas: State v. Sandstrom, 225 Kan. 717, 595 P.2d 324,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979); State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189 (1880); Kentucky:
Goehring v. Commonwealth, 370 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963); Louisiana: State
v. Petrich, 122 La. 127, 47 So. 438 (1908); Maine: State v. Bartlett, 105 Me. 212, 74 A.
18 (1909); Minnesota: State v. Rue, 72 Minn. 296, 75 N.W. 235 (1893); Mississippi:
Goldsby v.. State, 240 Miss. 647, 123 So. 2d 429 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861
(1961); Montana: State v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777 (1963); State v.
O'Brien, 35 Mont. 482, 90 P. 514 (1907); New Mexico: Baca v. Padilla, 26 N.M. 223,
190 P. 730 (1920); State v. Lucero, 20 N.M. 55, 146 P. 407 (1915); N. MEX. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-1-19 (1983); New Hampshire: State v. Fleury, 116 N.H. 577, 364 A.2d 625 (1976);
State v. Hale, 85 N.H 403, 160 A. 95 (132); New Jersey: State v. Mohr, 99 N.J. 124,
122 A. 837 (1924); Gardner v. State, 55 N.J. 617, 26 A. 30 (1892); New York: People v.
Van Sickle, 13 N.Y.2d 61, 242 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1963); People ex rel. Lucerno v. Cuozzo,
97 Misc. 2d 871, 412 N.Y.S.2d (1978); People on Complaint of Allen v. Citadel Man-
agement Co., 78 Misc. 2d 626, 355 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 80
Misc. 2d 668, 365 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1975); but see People v. Vlasto, 78 Misc. 2d 419, 355
N.Y.S.2d 983 (1974); North Carolina: State v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507 (N. Car. 1984);
State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972); North Dakota: State v. Kent, 4 N.D.
577, 62 N.W. 631 (1895); Ohio: State v. Ray, 102 Ohio App. 395, 143 N.E.2d 484 (157);
Oklahoma: Cole v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. App. 254, 175 P.2d 576 (1946); see also
Kizer v. State, 468 P.2d 56 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970); Pennsylvania: Commonwealth
v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944); Commonwealth v. Cicere, 282 Pa. 492, 128
A. 446 (1925); South Carolina: State v. Addis, 257 S.C. 482, 186 S.E.2d 415 (1972);
State v. Gregory, 172 S.C. 329, 174 S.E.10 (1934); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-7-
401 (Michie, 1980); Texas: Lopez v. State,, 437 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969);
Utah: People v. Tidwell, 4 Utah 506, 12 P. 61 (1886), rehearing denied, 5 Utah 88, 12
P. 638 (1887); Virginia: Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 107, 30 S.E.2d 452 (1898);
Washington: State v. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643, 67 P. 396 (1901); West Virginia: State v.
Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); State ex rel.
Goodwin v. Cook, 248 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1978); State ex rel. Moran v. Ziegler, 244
S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1978); State v. Lohm, 97 W. Va. 652, 125 S.E. 758 (1924).
The states in which it appears that participation of a private prosecutor in the
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tions the right of the victim to employ a private prosecutor is con-
ditioned upon the approval of the public prosecutor or trial
court.' 5 7
While relatively little is known about the actual prevalence of
this practice in jurisdictions where it is permissible, it may be
more prevalent than is commonly assumed. 158 Many of the judi-
cial decisions dealing with private prosecution involve homicide
cases where an attorney has been employed to act as a private
prosecutor by the victim's family or cases where an attorney has
been hired to prosecute some other type of serious offense.' 59
There is some evidence, however, that the use of private prosecu-
tors is particularly common in trial courts with limited criminal or
quasi-criminal jurisdiction.160
The activities of private prosecutors during trial range from
simply advising the public prosecutor to conducting the prosecu-
tion without the presence of a public prosecutor.161 One frequent
limitation imposed upon the activities of private prosecutors at
trial is the requirement that the public prosecutor must maintain
trial is expressly prohibited include the following: Massachusetts: Common-
wealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 222 (1877); but see Commonwealth v. Herman, 259 Mass.
616, 149 N.E. 198 (1925); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 49.158-776.18 (West
1967 & Supp. 1983); Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99 (1875); Missouri: State v. Har-
rington, 534 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1976); Nebraska: McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N.W.
741 (1911); Wisconsin: Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
157. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (consent of
trial court); State v. Lucero, 20 N.M. 55, 146 P. 407 (1915) (consent of public prose-
cutor and trial court); State v. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643, 67 P. 386 (1901) (consent of
trial court); People v. Tidwell, 4 Utah 506, 12 P. 61 (1886), reh'g denied, 5 Utah 88, 12
P. 686 (1887) (consent of public prosecutor and court).
158. A 1955 survey indicates that private attorneys regularly served as prosecu-
tors in criminal trials in lower courts in 28 states. Private Prosecution, supra note
112, at 221. See also CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM, supra note 1, at 35; F.
MILLER, supra note 113, at 331 n.152.
159. See, e.g., State v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507 (N. Car. 1984); Lopez v. State, 437
S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Goehring v. Commonwealth, 370 S.W.2d 822
(Ky. Ct. App. 1963).
160. See Private Prosecution, supra note 112, at 221.
161. See, e.g., State v. Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1979) (private prosecutor ex-
amined witnesses to a greater extent than public prosecutor); Ryals v. State, 434
P.2d 488 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967) (private prosecutor made opening statement,
presented the state's case in chief and rebuttal and cross-examined defense wit-
nesses); Goehring v. Commonwealth, 370 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. Cr. App. 1963) (private
counsel employed by victim's family sat at prosecution counsel table and advised
public prosecutor); People v. Van Sickle, 13 N.Y.2d 61, 242 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1963) (pros-
ecution conducted by complaining witness without presence of district attorney or
his assistant).
control of and supervise the prosecution,162 but this requirement
often seems to be loosely interpreted. 63
Retaining counsel to act as a private prosecutor at trial is a way
for the victim to protect his or her restitutive and retributive in-
terests because it helps to insure that the defendant will be pros-
ecuted in a manner consistent with these interests. The primary
motivation of victims who employ an attorney to function as a pri-
vate prosecutor is probably to secure vigorous prosecution of the
defendant. Victims may avail themselves of the option of hiring
an attorney to serve as a private prosecutor when the public pros-
ecutor is unable or unwilling to allocate the resources necessary
for successful prosecution, or if they lack confidence in the com-
mitment of the public prosecutor, or if they lack confidence in his
or her expertise.
Participation in the trial by an attorney hired by the victim to
act as a private prosecutor is frequently objected to on the ground
that it is prejudicial to the right of the defendant to a fair and im-
partial trial. Since the private prosecutor has been retained and
is being paid by the victim who wants to secure a conviction, it is
contended that there is a danger that the private prosecutor may
be overzealous; it is also contended that there is a danger that the
private prosecutor, when faced with a conflict between securing
the conviction that the victim wants and protecting the defend-
ant's rights, will opt for the former rather than the latter.164 The
standard response to this contention is that the defendant's rights
are adequately protected because counsel retained by the victim
must observe the same legal principles and rules that the public
prosecutor must observe and a judgment of conviction is subject
to reversal due to error on the part of victim's counsel. 165 Defend-
162. See, e.g., State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972); State v. Addis, 257
S.C. 482, 186 S.E.2d 415 (1972); Oglesby v. State, 87 Fla. 132, 90 So. 825 (1922).
163. See infra note 167; Private Prosecution, supra note 112, at 220.
164. See, e.g., Flege v. State, 93 Neb. 610, 613, 142 N.W. 276, 277 (1913) ("It is im-
possible to conceive of an attorney, after having served [the victim's brother] as
he had and for the purpose for which he had been employed, to enter upon the
trial with the single purpose of impartially seeking to know the truth, protecting
the rights of the defendant, and seeing that they were maintained, if need be, at all
hazards."); Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 449, 37 N.W. 244, 247-48 (1888) ("Criminal
cases are not likely to be (fairly conducted] if the prosecution is permitted to be
conducted by the paid attorneys of parties who from passion, prejudice, or even an
honest belief in the guilt of the accused, are desirous of procuring his conviction.")
See also Comment, supra note 28, at 773-80, 797-94; Private Prosecution, supra note
112, at 1173.
165. See, e.g., State v. Kent, 4 N.D. 577, 586, 2 N.W. 631, 634 (1895) ("It is the zeal
of counsel in the court room alone of which the accused can complain. . . .And if
such zeal in the court room, on the trial, does not result in error, what conceivable
difference can it make whether such assistance was employed by the public or by
private persons? ... The manner of conducting the case in the court room cannot
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ants are also protected by the requirements previously alluded to:
that counsel retained by the victim be under the "control" or "su-
pervision" of the public prosecutor, albeit this protection may be
more illusory than real if it is loosely interpreted.166
The effect of participation in the trial by a private prosecutor
upon the trial and the public prosecutor's performance of his or
her duties depends on a number of variables. On the one hand, it
could hinder the public prosecutor's effective and efficient presen-
tation of the state's case and unduly complicate and prolong the
trial. On the other hand, it could serve to augment limited
prosecutorial resources which could be especially helpful in cases
involving non-serious offenses to which the public prosecutor is
reluctant to devote staff and other resources.
Another approach to participation in the trial by counsel re-
tained by the victim, quite distinct from that of affording a victim
a general right to retain counsel to serve as a private prosecutor,
is to give victims with a special need for counsel the right to have
such representation. This approach has its advocates, 167 and leg-
islation adopting such an approach has been proposed in several
states and enacted in at least one state. 68 A strong argument can
be made for allowing the victim to be represented by counsel in
cases where the defense alleges that the victim provoked or pre-
cipitated the victimization and in cases where the defense chal-
lenges the victim's character and veracity. In these cases, victims
have at stake not only interests of a restitutive and retributive na-
ture but also the interests of preventing damage to their reputa-
tions and invasions of their privacy, being protected from defense
harassment and intimidation, and minimizing their psychological
trauma. 69 Presumably the role of counsel in such cases would
have to be tailored to the specific representation needs of the vic-
tim which gave rise to the right to be represented in the first
place.
work legal prejudice to the accused, without resulting in error for which the con-
viction will be set aside."). See also Private Prosecution, supra note 112, at 220-21.
166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., D. KELLY, supra note 91, at 4.
168. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 3; see
also ABA VIcTIM/WITNEss LEGISLATION, supra note 12, at 43-45.
169. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
D. Dispositional Stage: Sentencing
The dispositional stage of the criminal court proceeding is a
crucial one for the crime victim in terms of the victim's interest in
restitution and retribution. The sentence imposed by the court on
the convicted offender is determinative of whether the victim will
receive restitution and, if granted, how much restitution the vic-
tim will receive. The sentence imposed by the court is also deter-
minative of whether the victim's retributive needs and desires
will be satisfied. Given these interests, victims may want to con-
vey to the sentencing court their wishes regarding the sentencing.
In the event the victim's wishes do not prevail, there may still be
some value to the victim of having had the opportunity to have
"one's say in the matter."170
The right of victims to participate in the sentencing process
need not rest solely on the recognition that the victims have resti-
tutive and retributive interests that give them a stake in this pro-
cess. Victim participation can also be supported on the ground
that the victim has information relevant to an informed sentenc-
ing decision. Statutory sentencing schemes may expressly man-
date or permit that factors relating to the victim be taken into
account in fashioning a dispositional order. In some states, such
schemes set forth presumptive sentences for particular offenses
and specify aggravating or mitigating circumstances which the
court may consider in imposing a harsher or more lenient sen-
tence than the presumptive sentence. These statutorily defined
aggravating or mitigating factors may include factors such as the
offender's treatment of the victim during the commission of the
crime, the victim's provocation of or consent to the crime, and the
harm to the victim resulting from the crime. 17 1 In jurisdictions
170. See McDonald, supra note 68, at 107.
171. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-3.1(1), (3), & (6), § 1005-5-4.2(1)
(Smith-Hurd 1982) (factors to be considered in mitigation of sentence of imprison-
ment include whether "the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor
threatened serious physical harm to another," "the defendant acted under a strong
provocation," "the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of
his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained." Factors to be
considered in aggravation of sentence imprisonment include whether "the defend-
ant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-
7(a) (2), (b) (5) & (6), (c) (1), (3), (5) & (9) (Burns Supp. 1983) (court may enhance
sentence because of aggravating factors related to the offense, including the "vic-
tim of the crime was 65 years of age or older" and "the victim of the crime was
mentally or physically infirm." Mitigating factors include "the crime neither
caused nor threatened serious harm to persons or property," "the victim of the
crime induced or facilitated the offense," "[tIhe person acted under strong provo-
cation," "[tIhe person has made or will make restitution to the victim of the crime
for the injury, damage, or loss sustained."). See also, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 19-29, 42-47
(1976) [hereinafter cited as FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT].
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where presumptive sentencing legislation has not been enacted,
judges still sometimes consider factors relating to the victim as
aggravating or mitigating factors in the exercise of their discre-
tionary power to impose sentences.172 Furthermore, as has al-
ready been discussed, many sentencing statutes now provide for
victim restitution-which has become an increasingly popular
sentencing alternative-and the terms of a restitutive sentence
should turn upon the injuries, damages, and losses suffered by
the victim.' 73 Some of the information relating to the victim rele-
vant to an informed decision by the sentencing court may have
come out at trial. However, when a victim testifies at trial, the fo-
cus is the defendant's innocence or guilt, rather than the appro-
priate sentence for the defendant in the event of conviction.
One of the primary vehicles for providing the sentencing court
with information relevant to the sentencing decision is the pre-
sentence report usually prepared by the probation agency. In the
last several years, the inclusion of statements concerning the im-
pact of the crime upon the victim in the pre-sentence report has
been widely advocated.174 A number of states now have statutes
mandating or permitting the inclusion of "victim impact state-
ments" in pre-sentence reports175 and the Federal Victim and
172. See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 171, at 42-43.
173. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 2, 12-13; PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18, 33.
175. States expressly providing for victim impact statements in pre-sentence
investigation include the following: Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-253 (West
Supp. 1983) (in pre-sentence investigation probation officer shall inquire into im-
pact of crime upon victim and immediate family); California: CAL. PENAL CODE.
§ 1203(h) (West Supp. 1983) (pre-sentence report must include comments of vic-
tim in felony cases although court can waive this requirement if victim has testi-
fied at trial); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-91a(c) (1983) (the pre-sentence
investigator "shall" inquire into "the attitude of the complainant or victim, or of
the immediate family" in cases of homicide); Illinois: ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38 § 1005-
3-2(3) (1981) (mandatory victim impact statement); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
4, 1-4-10 (West 1978) (pre-sentence report must include any written statements
submitted to the prosecutor or probation officer by victim concerning the sen-
tence); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.3(5) (West Supp. 1983) (mandatory statement
of pecuniary damage to victim part of pre-sentence report); Kansas: KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4604(2) (1981) (the pre-sentence investigator "shall" inquire into "the at-
titude of the complainant or victim"); Louisiana: LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 875(B)
(West Supp. 1983) (court "shall" require victim impact statement); Maryland: MD.
CODE ANN., art. 41 § 124(2) (Michie Supp. 1983) (the pre-sentence report "shall" in-
clude a victim impact statement in felony cases if the felony caused "physical,
psychological or economic injury" to the victim and in misdemeanor cases if mis-
demeanor caused "serious physical injury or death" to victim); Minnesota: MINN.
Witness Protection Act specifically requires federal pre-sentence
reports to contain victim impact information. 7 6 There are also
some jurisdictions in which information regarding the impact of
the crime upon the victim and the victim's attitude toward the
sentence is included in the pre-sentence report, even without ex-
press statutory authorization. 177 There is considerable variation
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even within jurisdictions as
to the definition of victim for the purpose of the victim impact
statement, the type of cases in which statements are utilized, the
content of the statements, and the method of preparing
statements.178
Another vehicle for victim participation in the dispositional de-
cision-making process is the sentencing hearing. The victim's
characterization as a witness rather than as a party to the action
STAT. ANN. § 609.115 (West Supp. 1983) (court may order pre-sentence report con-
cerning "harm caused" by crime in misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor or felony
cases); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-112 (1981) (when investigation is re-
quired, probation officer shall inquire into the harm to victim and his immediate
family); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.136(3) (1980) (mandatory victim impact
statement); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504:2 (Equity Supp. 1979)
(pre-sentence report must contain summary of an interview "with the victim, if a
natural person or member or members of his family"); New Jersey: N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:44-6(b) (West 1982) (victim has right to have impact statement included
in pre-sentence report); New York: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1982) (pre-sentence report is to include victim impact statement "When it
appears that such information would be relevant to the recommendation or court
disposition"); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.051 (Anderson, 1983 Supp.) (vic-
tim impact statement required before sentencing if offender caused, threatened or
created risks of physical injury to victim); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 982 (West Supp. 1982) (statement of victim concerning offense and amount of
loss shall be included in pre-sentence report in felony cases); Virginia: VA. CODE
§ 19.2-299-1 (1983) (pre-sentence report may, in discretion of court, include victim
impact statement if court determines defendant caused significant injury to vic-
tim).
See also UNIFORM LAw COMMISSIONERS, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS
ACT § 3-204 (1978) (the pre-sentence report must set forth information "relating to
any aggravating or mitigating factors," facts "to assist the court in imposing...
restitution," and "any statement relating to statement submitted by the victim of
the offense").
176. 18 U.S.C. § 3580 (Supp. 1984) (court in determining whether to order resti-
tution shall consider loss sustained by victim as result of the offense and may or-
der probation service to obtain such information concerning such loss). See also
FED. R. CliM. P. 32(c) (2) (pre-sentence report shall include information concern-
ing any harm done or loss suffered by victim and any other information that may
aid the court, including victim's restitution needs).
177. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 13. See also D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE
AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 109-10 (2d ed. 1969) ("The court will want
to consider the complainant's attitude," and "to have that individual's attitude de-
fined in the report.") But see Hall, supra note 113, at 956 n.134 ("Articles dealing
with pre-sentence investigations ignore altogether the victim's attitude as a com-
ponent of the report"); R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE,
LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 17 n.8, 33 (1969) (containing only two brief
references to the role of the victim in sentencing).
178. See supra note 174.
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has generally meant that the victim has no right of allocution at
the sentencing hearing and must depend upon the prosecution to
present his or her views. Only a few states extend the right of al-
locution to the victim at the sentencing hearing.179
Concerns about allowing the victims to participate in the sen-
tencing hearing are similar to concerns about victim participation
in decision-making at earlier stages of the proceeding and center
chiefly around the apprehension that the impartiality and fairness
of the sentencing process would suffer.180 More specifically, it can
be argued that it is unnecessary for victims to appear at sentenc-
ing hearings because the prosecutor can and will present any in-
formation relating to the victim which is relevant to the
sentencing decision; that the victims who would be likely to ap-
pear at sentencing hearings would be overly vindictive; and that
judges would be moved by the presentations of victims to aban-
don their objectivity in making sentencing decisions to the disad-
vantage of convicted offenders. This argument obviously rests
upon assumptions about the behavior of these actors that have
not really been tested and which may or may not be true.18'
179. States expressly permitting victim to be present and heard at sentencing
hearing include the following: Alabama: ALA. CODE § 15-18-7 (1982) ("[W]hen a
defendant is convicted of a criminal activity or conduct which has resulted in pe-
cuniary damages or loss to a victim, the court shall hold a [restitution] hearing"
and permit "the victim or victims, or their representatives . . . to be present and
be heard upon the issue of restitution"); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(h)
(West Supp. 1983) (victim has right of allocation sentencing of felony offenders,
but sentencing court has discretion with respect to presentation by victim if victim
has testified at trial); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-91c (1983) (victim
has right to make or submit statement at sentencing of offenders convicted of
Class A, B, or C felonies); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143(1) (West Supp. 1983)
(victim has right to appear and to make verbal or written statement under oath at
sentencing hearing of offender who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere); Maine:
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1257(2) (West Supp. 1983) (if victimlis present in
the courtroom at time of sentencing, victim upon request shall have' the right to
address the court).
180. See supra notes 123-24, 151, 164-66 and accompanying text. See ABA
GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 14; PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at
77.
181. The response of the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime to objec-
tions as to allowing the victim to be present and heard at the sentencing hearing
was as follows:
The . . . argument is that participation by victims at sentencing will place
improper pressure on judges. The duty of a judge is to dispense justice,
and the passing of judgment is a difficult task. The difficulty of the task
should not be relieved, however, by discharging it unfairly. Hearing from
the defendant and his family and looking into the faces of his children
while passing sentence is not easy, but no one could responsibly suggest
Moreover, when information related to the victim which might
influence the court's sentence is furnished to the court, it be-
comes important to the defense to have access to and the oppor-
tunity to rebut this information. Such access and opportunity
would seem especially important to the defense in cases where
the victim seeks restitution and makes certain claims about inju-
ries, damages, and losses for purposes of restitution. At the pres-
ent time such information is transmitted to the court primarily
through the pre-sentence report and the defendant may have only
limited access to this report and may not be able to confront and
cross-examine the victim directly as to the accuracy of the infor-
mation. If, however, the victim is present at and participates in
the sentencing hearing, there will be full disclosure of the victim's
claims and views as to the appropriate sentence and the defense
counsel can refute these claims and respond to these views. Al-
though it is unclear whether and to what degree federal due pro-
cess guarantees apply to the dispositional process,182 victim
participation in the hearing may forestall potential constitutional
challenges to the process by the defendant. 183
E. The Expansion of the Victim's Role and Characterization of
the Victim as a Party
As the foregoing indicates, the crime victim's formal role in the
criminal proceeding could be expanded so as to give the victim a
variety of rights to participate in the proceeding at various stages.
These rights could range at one end of the spectrum from some
victim control over the decision-making process at various stages
that the defendant be denied his right to be heard or suffer a sentence im-
posed in secret in order to spare the judge. The victim, no less than the
defendant, has a real and personal interest in seeing the imposition of a
just penalty. The goal of victim participation is not to pressure justice, but
to aid in its attainment. The judge cannot take a balanced view if his in-
formation is acquired from only one side. The prosecutor can begin to
present the other side, but he was not personally affected by the crime or
its aftermath, and may not be fully aware of the price the victim has paid.
It is as unfair to require that the victim depend solely on the intercession
of the prosecutor as it would be to require that the defendant rely solely
on his counsel.
Id. at 78.
182. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949). But see Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); State v. Kunz, 55
N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (N.J. 1969).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (the
provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act requiring a defendant con-
victed of a federal crime to pay restitution to the victim were violative of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. The court struck down the Act because of
the lack of evidentiary safeguards and the failure to recognize defense counsel's
right to prepare for a trial on the merits of the damages issue at the sentencing
hearing.).
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to simple notification of the victim of the status of the case at vari-
ous stages at the other end of the spectrum. In between these
two extremes there could be varying degrees of victim input into
the decision-making process at various stages.
Expansion of the victim's role in the criminal proceeding raises
the issue of whether the current characterization of the victim as
a non-party witness is suitable. If the victim's role is expanded
substantially enough to give the victim real input into and even
some control over the decision-making process, the victim's posi-
tion vis-a-vis the criminal proceeding begins to resemble that nor-
mally associated with party status.18 4 It should be noted that
there can be different types of parties with varying attributes,
playing different roles in terms of the nature and extent of their
participation in a proceeding. Thus, the characterization of the
victim as a party would not necessarily mean that the victim
would have the same or comparable rights to the state or the de-
fendant at all stages of the proceedings.1 8 5
Characterization of the victim as a party to the criminal pro-
ceeding would signal a basic reorientation of the criminal justice
system toward the goal of providing redress to the victim and vin-
dicating their interests in restitution and retribution. As long as
the victim's role is defined as that of simply a witness rather than
a party to the criminal proceeding, it is likely that participation in
criminal proceedings by victims will be seen as a privilege rather
than an entitlement. Thus one of the benefits which can be antici-
pated to flow from characterizing the victim as a party is a change
in the attitude and behavior of actors in the criminal justice sys-
tem-prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.
If victims are given a larger role in criminal proceedings and
characterized as parties to the proceeding, a related but nonethe-
less distinct issue is how to determine who is a victim for pur-
poses of participation in the criminal proceeding. 8 6 Should
184. One of the few advocates of expansion of the role of the victim who has
dealt with giving the victim party status is Professor Goldstein. Goldstein, supra
note 19, at 557.
185. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 393-449, 511-16 (2d
ed. 1965); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Ar-
bitrators, 81 HARv. L. REV. 721 (1968).
186. See Hall, supra note 113, at 934. Legislatures and courts have struggled
with an analogous problem, namely, how to define victim for the purpose of com-
pensation to victims by the state. See, e.g., People v. Grago, 24 Misc. 2d 739, 204
N.Y.S.2d 774 (1960); State v. Green, 29 N.C. App. 574, 225 S.E.2d 170 (1976); State v.
participation be confined to those who have suffered direct harm
and damages as a result of the crime? Should the victim's family
be included? Who, if anyone, should be regarded as the victim of
an offense against public orders and morals? Or regulatory
crimes? Or white collar crimes?
V. THE ROLE OF THE CRIME VICTIM UNDER OTHER LEGAL
SYSTEMS
Some foreign criminal justice systems define the formal role of
the victim in a criminal action much more broadly than the Amer-
ican criminal justice system, and a study of foreign systems holds
out the prospect of providing models for fashioning an expanded
role for the crime victim in the American system.
Turning first to the English criminal justice system, with which
the American system shares a common law heritage, England has
retained private prosecution with private citizens, including vic-
tims, having the right to commence criminal actions.18 7 The bulk
of criminal prosecutions are still private prosecutions, albeit the
term private prosecutions is something of a misnomer as applied
to many of these prosecutions. Most private prosecutions are
brought by the police ostensibly acting in their private capac-
ity,188 and it has been observed that the victim is usually content
to report a suspected criminal matter to the police and leave to
them the conduct of any criminal proceedings. 8 9
The private prosecution is more restricted now than formerly.
The Director of Public Prosecutions, created in 1879 and reorga-
nized in 1905, has considerable authority with respect to both
public and private criminal prosecutions. The Director prosecutes
any case punishable by death, any case where his participation is
ordered by the Home Secretary, any case referred to him by other
government departments if he sees fit to do so, and any case
which appears to him to be sufficiently important or difficult to re-
quire his intervention.190 The Director's approval is also a prereq-
uisite to private prosecutions for certain designated offenses, and
it is within his discretion to intervene in and take over private
Stalheim, 275 Or. App. 683, 552 P.2d 829 (1976). See also Harland, supra note 8, at
78-80.
187. See R.M. JACKSON, supra note 33, at 213; P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSE-
CUTION IN ENGLAND 20 (1958); Williams, The Power to Prosecute, 1955 CRIM. L. REV.
596, 597 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
188. See R.M. JACKSON, supra note 33, at 215-19.
189. R.M. JACKSON, supra note 33, at 214; DEVLIN, supra note 196, at 20.
190. See R.M. JACKSON, supra note 33, at 220-22; The Prosecution Process in Eng-
land and Wales, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 668, 670-71 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Prosecu-
tion Process in England 1; Williams, supra note 187, at 602.
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prosecution.191 The Attorney General has the additional power to
halt the prosecution of private prosecutions involving indictable
offenses by entering a nolle prosequi. 192
While various commissions and committees have called for the
restructuring of the system of private prosecution and have advo-
cated that an independent public official handle the majority of
prosecutions currently brought and conducted by the police, they
have generally recommended the retention of the true private
prosecution-those brought by victims and other private citi-
zens. 9 3 For the most part, the initiation of a crime action by a
private citizen seems to be viewed as an important constitutional
guarantee against abuse of prosecutorial discretion by public
officials.194
Interestingly enough, the Scottish system of prosecution has
developed along somewhat different lines than the English sys-
tem. Prosecutorial power is centralized and concentrated in the
Lord Advocate, his deputies, and the procurators fiscal. 9 5 The
victim still has the right of private prosecution but in an attenu-
ated form. The victim may institute a private prosecution with
the concurrence of the public prosecutor, and if the public prose-
cutor refuses to concur, the victim may apply to the High Court to
allow the prosecution.196
Continental criminal justice systems also appear to furnish a
contrast to the American system in their protection of victim in-
terests. The role of the victim under the French system is espe-
cially noteworthy. The crime victim can bring a civil action for
damages, called the action civile; a victim who brings such a civil
action can intervene in the related criminal action brought by the
public prosecutor; and, the victim, through his or her counsel, can
play a very active role in prosecuting the defendant and asserting
his or her own right to civil damages.197 Furthermore, by bringing
191. See E. DEVIN, supra note 187, at 23-24; Prosecution Process in England,
supra note 190, at 671.
192. See R.M. JACKSON, supra note 33, at 221; P. DEVLIN, supra note 187, at 20-21.
See also supra note 111.
193. See, e.g., Prosecution Process in England, supra note 190, at 681. See also
R.M. JACKSON, supra note 33, at 225-26.
194. See Williams, supra note 187, at 599.
195. See generally, S. MOODY & J. TOMBS, PROSECUTION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
18-30 (1982) [hereinafter cited as S. MOODY & J. TOMBS].
196. A. SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND AND FRANCE 116 (1975).
197. Pugh & Pugh, Measures for Malaise: Recent French "Law and Order" Leg-
islation, .42 LA. L. REV. 1302, 1318-19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Pugh & Pugh]. For
the civil action in the criminal courts, the victim can obligate the
public prosecutor to begin a criminal action despite the fact that
the prosecutor does not wish to do s0.198 A 1981 law made it pos-
sible for the victim to intervene as a civil party in the pending
criminal proceeding simply through a registered letter containing
any pertinent documents and by allowing the court to charge the
criminal defendant with expenses otherwise chargeable to the in-
tervening civil party.199 A significant number of victims seek relief
by intervening as a civil party in criminal proceedings, rather
than by instituting separate civil proceedings.200
Other continental systems also provide some protection to the
interests of victims. For example, in Austria, a crime victim may
file a "subsidiary charge" if the prosecutor does not prosecute; 20
in Denmark the victim must be notified if a prosecution is aban-
doned and may appeal the prosecutor's decision to a superior
prosecutor 202 and in West Germany victims cannot directly initi-
ate a criminal action but they can seek a mandamus type of order
compelling a prosecutor to press charges. 20 3
Foreign criminal justice systems would seem to demonstrate
that the narrow formal role assigned to crime victims in the
American criminal justice system is not their only possible role.
A caveat is that the available literature largely describes the for-
mal structure of foreign systems as opposed to actual practices,
and more studies of an empirical nature are necessary before
truly meaningful comparisons can be made between foreign sys-
tems and the American system. It must also be borne in mind
that the American criminal justice system differs substantively
and procedurally from foreign criminal justice systems, and that
the American system reflects political, economic, and social condi-
tions that differ from those in other countries. Consequently, the
a detailed discussion of the French procedure, see Campbell, A Comparative
Study of Victim Compensation Procedures in France and the United States: A
Modest Proposal, 3 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 323-32 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Campbell]; Larguier, The Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal Proce-
dure, 39 TuL. L. REV. 687 (1965).
198. See Campbell, supra note 197, at 324-25; Volkmann-Schluck, Continental
European Criminal Procedures. True or Illusive Model?, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 20
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Volkman-Schluck].
199. Pugh & Pugh, supra note 197, at 1319.
200. Id. at 1319.
201. Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 198, at 19.
202. S. MOODY & J. TOMBS, supra note 195, at 17-18; see generally L. LEIGH & J.
HALL-WILLIAMS; THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION PROCESS IN DENMARK,
SWEDEN AND THE NETHERLANDS(1981).
203. Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 198, at 20. See generally Hermann, The
Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Ger-
many, 41 U. CHI. L. RE V. 468 (1974); Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion
in Germany, 41 U. CH. L, REV. 439 (1974).
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adaptability of features of foreign systems to the American sys-
tem may be limited.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND VICTIM INPUT
AND CONTROL
Before undertaking a fundamental restructuring of the role of
the crime victim in a criminal proceeding, the use of alternatives
to criminal prosecution to meet victim needs and desires merits
exploration. Since a criminal case can be seen as a dispute to be
resolved between the victim and the offender, mediation and arbi-
tration present a possible alternative to the criminal action. In
mediation, the disputing parties voluntarily agree to submit their
dispute to a neutral third party who assists them in resolving the
dispute; arbitration differs from mediation in that the neutral
third party "is authorized to make a determination which is bind-
ing and enforceable in the courts."20 4
In the early 1970's, proposals began to appear for using media-
tion and arbitration as alternatives to criminal prosecution. Inter-
est in this approach has intensified in recent years as a result of
the perception that the courts were ill-equipped to handle crimi-
nal cases arising out of inter-personal disputes and as a result of
overburdened criminal court dockets. 20 5 Today, there are a
number of mediation and arbitration programs throughout the
country which handle disputes that could be processed as crimi-
nal cases.206 Evaluations of these programs have been generally
favorable. 20 7 Among the advantages these programs offer to crim-
inal victims is direct involvement in the disposition of their case
and an increased likelihood of satisfaction with the outcome.
Thus far, these programs have confined themselves largely to
handling the less serious criminal-type inter-personal disputes,
204. VERA, supra note 106, at 1.
205. Id. at 2-3; see also Greacen, Arbitration: A Tool for Criminal Cases?, 2
BARRISTER 10 (Winter 1975).
206. See, e.g., B. ANNo & B. HOFF, REFUNDING EVALUATION REPORT ON THE MU-
NICIPAL COURT OF PHILADELPHIA 4A PROJECT (1975); R. BUSH, SAN FRANCISCO 4A
PROJECT ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE (1977); R. CONNOR & R. SURETrE, AN
EVALUATION OF THE CITIZEN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM OF THE ORANGE
COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION (1977); D. McGiLLs & J. MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUS-
TICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL METHODS 89-172 (1977) (Nat'l Institute
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Dep't) [hereinafter cited as D.
McGILLIS & J. MULLEN]; VERA, supra note 106.
207. VERA, supra note 106, at 12-13, 39-57.
between disputants who have a prior and usually an ongoing rela-
tionship.208 These are, of course, precisely the kind of cases that
prosecutors are least likely to pursue. It is unclear whether medi-
ation and arbitration might be successfully utilized for more seri-
ous criminal cases.209
The expansion of mediation and arbitration as alternatives to
criminal prosecution might well alleviate some of the problems
victims presently face in dealing with the criminal court process,
and the success of these programs suggests the need to investi-
gate more fully such alternatives to criminal prosecution in the
context of assisting victims.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a growing recognition that crime victims have identifi-
able interests of sufficient legitimacy and significance to justify
expanding their role in criminal proceedings beyond that of non-
party witnesses. Their role could be expanded through the exten-
sion to them of a variety of participatory rights at various stages
of the criminal proceeding in order to give them real input into
and perhaps even some control over criminal proceedings. In re-
cent years, reforms aimed at extending such rights to victims
have been proposed and implemented.
Substantial expansion of the formal role of the victim in a crim-
inal proceeding, though justifiable, does raise a host of compli-
cated issues and problems. While time and space constraints
have precluded an exhaustive analysis of these issues and
problems in this article, it is to be hoped that the article will pro-
vide an analytical framework for consideration of reforms to in-
crease victim participation in criminal proceedings.
Given the many unanswered questions at the present time
about the impact of expanding the victim's formal role in a crimi-
nal proceeding, it may well be advisable to establish and carefully
evaluate a number of small scale projects and programs designed
to increase the participation of victims in criminal proceedings
before a wholesale -restructuring of the system is undertaken. Fi-
nally, efforts to increase victim participation in criminal proceed-
ings should not divert attention from other needed reforms in the
criminal justice system which would increase its overall effective-
ness and efficiency and, which, by so doing, would lead to an im-
proved position for and treatment of victims.
208. See D. McGILLis & J. MULLEN, supra note 201, at 54-60, 97-99, 110-13, 126-27,
138-39, 153-54, 167-68.
209. See VERA, supra note 106.
